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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study developed tools for assessing the distributional effects of alternative highway user
fees for light vehicles in Oregon. The analysis used the example of a change from the current
gasoline tax to a VMT fee structure for collecting highway user fees. The questions
addressed were as follows:
1) Would the change to a VMT fee be regressive, placing disproportionate hardship on
those in lower income groups?
2) Would rural areas in Oregon be adversely impacted relative to urban areas?
3) Would a change to a VMT fee discourage people from acquiring alternative fuel
vehicles or more fuel efficient vehicles and thus would be contrary to the state and
national priority of reducing fossil fuel use?
A static model and a regression model were developed and used to provide answers to the
first two questions. A discrete-continuous choice model was also explored and recommended
for future development to better address the third issue.
Results indicated that the income distributional impact of changing to an approximately
revenue-neutral VMT fee of 1.2 cents per mile would result in a slight increase in regressivity
relative to the regressive structure of the current gasoline tax. The impact for the lowest
income group amounted to a change of less than one percent of their income. As a
comparison, the increase in total gasoline expenditures that was caused by the near doubling
of gasoline prices from $1.46/ gallon to $2.64/gallon between 2001 and 2006 was over five
percent of income for the lowest income group.
The impact of the change to a VMT fee on rural areas was found to be opposite to that
suggested by conventional wisdom. On average a household in a rural location would pay
less under a revenue-neutral VMT fee of 1.2 cents per mile than under the gasoline tax,
whereas those in urban areas would pay slightly more. This was largely due to the lower
overall average fuel efficiency in the rural vehicle fleet relative to the urban fleet and the
greater number of miles driven on average by rural households.
Results suggested that a change to a VMT fee would not be likely to create a significant
disincentive to purchase more fuel efficient or hybrid vehicles. This was because the change
in fee structure had such a small impact on the cost of driving relative to the price of gasoline.
Indeed, continued increases in gasoline prices would dwarf any change in per-mile costs
caused by the change in user fee structure considered here. It is higher gasoline prices that
are likely to produce the increases in driving costs of the magnitude necessary to create the
incentive to adopt more fuel efficient vehicles.
The study concluded that a change from the current gasoline tax to a VMT fee structure of
the type considered in this study, would have a negligible impact on income distribution.
Further, concerns that rural households would be adversely impacted by the change in fee
structure were unfounded, as rural households would actually benefit relative to urban
households. Preliminary results suggested that the change in user fee structure considered
ix

here would not be likely to significantly impact vehicle choice. If future promotion of more
fuel efficient vehicles is a policy priority, further development of the discrete-continuous
choice model would be desirable to have a tool that can better predict how policy changes
may affect vehicle choice in the long run.

x

1.0 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study was to develop analytical tools for examining the distributional
impact of changing from the current state gasoline tax to a vehicle miles traveled (VMT) fee.
Interest in this topic has arisen because it has become evident that the gasoline tax – the
primary way that highway user fees are collected at both state and federal levels in the U.S. –
may no longer be able to generate the funds needed to build and maintain the highway
system. That this has become a national concern is evidenced by the 2006 Transportation
Research Board Special Report #285 submitted by the TRB committee for the study of the
long-term viability of fuel taxes for highway finance (TRB 2006).
There are several reasons for the inadequacy of the gasoline tax as a long-term source of
highway finance. First, public resistance to increases in the gasoline tax at both federal and
state levels results in highway revenue growth falling short of the growth in highway costs.
The current Oregon state gasoline tax of 24 cents per gallon has been in effect since 1991,
when this tax represented over 20 percent of the price of a gallon of gasoline. Today, with
gasoline prices around $4.00/gallon, the 24-cent-per-gallon tax is about six percent of the
price of gasoline. During this same time period, the purchasing power of highway revenues
has eroded as the cost of construction materials such as concrete and steel has increased even
faster than inflation.
Potentially exacerbating the highway finance shortfall in the future is the development of
alternative fuels, which are not currently subject to gasoline/diesel fuel taxes, together with
increases in fuel efficiency. These factors have made it clear that an alternative to the
gasoline tax will be necessary if highways are to be maintained and built to meet current and
future needs (Forkenbrock 2002).
This state of affairs in highway finance became such an important concern that the State of
Oregon established a Road User Fee Task Force (RUFTF) in 2001 to consider alternatives to
the gasoline tax for funding road maintenance and improvement. The RUFTF concluded that
a distance-based fee, or vehicle miles traveled (VMT) fee, was one of the most promising
alternatives to the gasoline tax.
One obstacle to collecting a VMT fee has been the absence of a technology sophisticated
enough to count vehicle miles driven in the state. However, in a previous Oregon
Department of Transportation (ODOT) study researchers at Oregon State University
developed and tested a technology that would allow collection of highway user fees in this
manner (Whitty, et al. 2006). With further development, the technology is no longer likely to
be a real constraint on the establishment of a highway user fee.
Perhaps more problematic than the technology are public concerns regarding social equity
and distributional effects of a VMT fee. In Oregon several concerns are expressed regularly
to policymakers:
1. It has been suggested that the change in tax structure would shift the burden of the tax
to lower income groups.
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2. There is a concern that the change in the tax structure would shift the burden of the
tax to rural areas from urban areas, creating regional or geographic inequities.
3. Concerns have been expressed that such a shift in tax structure would discourage
people from purchasing and driving alternative fuel vehicles, hybrids in particular.
The purpose of this research was to provide a perspective on these three issues that are often
raised in objection to the implementation of a VMT fee. The following section in this chapter
reviews the existing literature and approaches to these questions. Chapter 2 provides a
discussion of the different models and methods that can be used to evaluate the impact of
changing from the gasoline tax to a VMT fee. Chapter 3 reviews the data available for this
study and provides summary statistics for the state of Oregon. Chapters 4 and 5 provide the
results obtained for Oregon, first using a static model and then using an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression model that accounts for the feedback effects of a change in tax on demand.
Chapter 6 presents the preliminary framework for a more sophisticated discrete choicecontinuous model that would allow longer-term impact evaluation. Conclusions are
presented in the final chapter along with recommendations for future research on a distancebased fee.

1.1

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

From an economic point of view, and from the perspective of policymakers, the purpose of
either a gasoline tax or a VMT fee is to charge an optimal road user fee. An optimal road user
fee is one in which the users of the road pay the marginal costs they impose on the road
system. There is an extensive literature on optimal road user fees under both congested and
uncongested circumstances (Morrison 1986; Small, Winston and Evans 1989).
There are two components to a user fee for the road system: road wear costs and congestion
costs. Maintenance costs for pavement are the primary component of road wear costs.
Congestion costs are incurred when traffic does not flow freely, indicating that road capacity
has been reached (Small, Winston and Evans 1989).
When there is congestion, optimal user fees will be higher than in non-congested
circumstances, and revenues collected may exceed those required to maintain the existing
road system, thus providing funds for capacity increases. The implementation of optimal
congestion fees and their political acceptability is the major focus of much research and
experimentation in the area of road pricing. Except for a few select urban areas, congestion
pricing is not in place and represents a major change from what road users are accustomed to
paying.
Although this study could easily be extended to consider issues involved in charging
congestion fees, the main focus here will be on road user fees under non-congested
circumstances. What distinguishes this from congestion pricing is that in almost all
countries, road users already pay a road user fee. Thus, a change from the gasoline tax to a
VMT fee does not represent a new tax, but rather a different way of collecting user fees that
are already being paid.
Indeed, the “user-pay” concept as a basic financing principle in transportation dates back to
Pigou in the 1920s. Under ideal conditions, the revenue collected from marginal cost tolls
will just be sufficient to finance the transportation network to its optimal level of capacity
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(Mohring and Harwitz 1962). In practice, however, this simple and elegant road pricing and
investment principle encounters technological, institutional, and political difficulties.
In 1919 Oregon became the first state to impose a fuel tax to raise money to finance road
maintenance and construction; other states quickly followed suit (McMullen 2005). In years
past, the gasoline tax was generally seen as an equitable and efficient way of charging road
user fees for light vehicles such as autos and pickup trucks, since there were not the large
differences in fuel efficiency that we see today. Miles driven and thus road damage were
highly correlated to gasoline consumption. Given the wide disparity of fuel efficiencies in
the current vehicle fleet, however, the gasoline tax has become a less accurate reflection of
the marginal costs users impose on the road system.
In the state of Oregon, heavy trucks (weighing over 26,000 pounds) are subject to a weightmile tax which provides a reasonably good approximation of the marginal damage that they
do to the roads. In the case of heavy trucks, the damage that they do to the roads is
exponentially and directly related to their weight (Small, Winston and Evans 1989). Thus,
trucks operating in the state of Oregon already pay a distance-based fee and one that carries
higher tax rates for truck configurations that impose greater costs on the road system. Light
vehicles (up to 26,000 pounds) in Oregon still pay road user fees through fuel taxes.
Short run marginal road costs from autos and other light vehicles are directly related to miles
driven and, despite increasing variance in vehicle weights (and fuel efficiency), there is not
much difference in the damage done to the road by different types of light vehicles (whereas
there is a big difference in damage to the road done by heavy trucks of different weight
groups and with different axle configurations). Indeed, Merriss (2004) notes that the
“difference in pavement damage imposed by a 6,000-pound large SUV versus a 3,500-pound
compact car is inconsequential as compared to the difference in (pavement) damage imposed
by either of these vehicles versus a fully-loaded 80,000-pound truck” (p.2).
Of the vehicle miles driven in the state of Oregon in 2002, 92 percent of the vehicle-miles
driven were attributable to light vehicles. Thus, Merriss (2004) argues that the primary way
light vehicles affect highway costs is through the sheer numbers of miles they drive and their
impact on congestion, thus producing the demand for additional road capacity.
Konkelman and Shahib (2000) argue that light trucks and SUV’s increase headways between
vehicles, reducing the capacity at intersections and increasing urban congestion. Thus, in the
long run, when capacity expansions are considered or when the goal is to alleviate
congestion, it might be better to follow the current convention in use in the Oregon Highway
Cost Allocation Study, and charge light vehicles on the basis of their passenger car equivalent
(PCE) weighted vehicle-miles rather than vehicle miles alone.
Sorenson and Taylor (2005) argue that equity concerns are not so great for a “straight”
distance-based user fee that is not linked to a congestion fee, and they suggest introducing a
vehicle mile fee first and later revising it to accommodate congestion pricing.
Whatever the exact fee structure, the main goal for a state government is to charge road user
fees that will provide an adequate source of finance for the highway system. It should be
noted that Oregon dedicates all highway user fees to the Highway fund unlike many other
states, which place highway user fees into a general fund, mixing revenue sources. The
proposed change from a gasoline tax to a vehicle-mile or distance-based fee for light vehicles
in Oregon would come closer to meeting this objective than the current gasoline tax. Indeed,
3

a VMT fee is something that is being considered not only by the State of Oregon, but at the
national level (TRB 2006).
The following sections discuss and provide a preliminary review of the potential socioeconomic/political impacts resulting from such a change in tax structure.

1.1.1 General incidence
To determine the distributional impact of changing from the gasoline tax to a VMT fee
requires first determining the general incidence of the gasoline tax – who pays the gasoline
tax, the gasoline retailer or the consumer?
Alm and Sonnoga (2005) find full shifting of gasoline taxes to the final consumer.
Chouinard and Perloff (2004) find that while the federal gas tax falls about half on the
consumer and half on the gasoline retailer, they find that virtually all of a state gasoline tax is
borne by the retail customer. In addition, they find that the incidence of state gasoline taxes
on the consumer is inversely related to the share of national gasoline tax sales in the state;
thus a greater part of the state gas tax is borne by customers in states with a smaller share of
the national gasoline bill. Based on these findings, in the case of Oregon it is reasonable to
assume that it is the consumer, rather than the retailer, who ends up paying the state gasoline
tax.
For a VMT fee, it is clear that the tax is being paid by the final consumer. Thus, for practical
purposes it makes no difference which way the road user fee is collected; it is ultimately paid
by the consumer in the state of Oregon.
1.1.2

Income Distributional Impact

Since the demand for gasoline is known to be inelastic, it is usually argued that the gasoline
tax is regressive.
A 1990 Congressional Budget Office Report (CBO 1990) found that the tax on motor fuels
was regressive relative to annual income but generally proportional with respect to total
expenditures.
Sarah West (2001, 2005) explores the distributional impact of implementing vehicle
emissions taxes on automobiles, and her work touches on a number of issues relevant to our
study. West follows Poterba’s (1991) suggestion that household expenditures be used rather
than household income in examining tax incidence. His argument is that decisions regarding
gasoline expenditures may be based on lifetime or permanent income rather than the annual
income observed in a typical cross-section study. He uses annual expenditures as a proxy for
permanent income, and his results show that low income households actually devote a
smaller share of their expenditures to gasoline than higher income households. Further, he
finds that households in the top five percent of the income distribution spend a smaller
percent on gasoline, so that the gasoline tax actually is progressive over lower income groups
and then turns regressive at higher levels of income.
West (2001) uses expenditures as a proxy for income and finds the gasoline tax to be
progressive across lower income groups, a result she attributes to the greater elasticity of
demand lower income groups have in response to changes in gasoline prices. In her
empirical results, she also examines the impact of a per-mile emissions tax and finds that
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taxes on miles is progressive over lower income deciles (as a percentage of total household
expenditures) but becomes regressive over the upper deciles.
For a gasoline tax, the regressivity depends in part on how responsive the miles driven by
people in different income groups are to changes in the tax (included in the price of gasoline).
It also depends on the type of vehicle driven by people in the different income groups as well
as the number of miles driven by people in the various income groups.
West and Williams (2004) argue that ignoring demand responses to changes in gasoline
prices will result in more regressive measures. Thus, one reason for West’s (2001) results is
that she finds that the elasticity of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) with respect to changes in
the per mile cost of driving, is greater (-1.51) for those in the lowest decile of income than
those in the higher deciles. (For example, she finds an elasticity of -0.75 for those in decile 8
in her sample.) This elasticity, combined with the fact that a large proportion of households
in the lowest decile do not own vehicles and thus do not pay any gasoline tax, results in the
gasoline tax being less regressive than conventional wisdom may dictate.
At this point it is important to raise the question of whether the finding that the gasoline tax is
progressive at lower income levels is really providing the right information about the welfare
of people in the lower income groups. While those in the lower income groups may pay
proportionally less of their income in gasoline taxes than the upper income groups, this may
well be because they face significant mobility and access limitations due to their income
status. For instance, low income households are more likely to not own a vehicle; thus they
do not bear the burden of gasoline taxes, but they may have mobility problems and suffer
consequences in the job market as a result. The elderly also have lower vehicle ownership
rates, so they appear to be less affected by gasoline taxes, but this reflects their mobility
constraints. If all income levels had the same mobility and car ownership characteristics, it
might be that the gasoline tax would be regressive over all income groups. Thus, care must
be taken in interpreting these income incidence measures.
It is important to note that the incidence of the gasoline tax depends partly on the vehicle
choice made by different income groups. West (2001) argues that households in the lower
deciles own vehicles that have poorer gas mileage, making their per mile cost of gasoline
higher than those in higher income groups. This contributes to making the price elasticity of
that group more sensitive to changes in tax rates. Given that West’s data comes from the
1980’s when auto manufacturers were just retooling and starting to produce more fuel
efficient vehicles, this finding makes sense, because lower income people who were unable to
purchase the new vehicles had to make do with less fuel efficient, older models.
In the 1990’s, however, there have been mixed messages regarding fuel efficiency. On one
hand there have been very fuel efficient cars that have come on the market, but conventional
wisdom suggests that many people in the middle/upper income groups have gravitated
towards heavier SUVs that get fewer miles per gallon. Thus the trend towards greater fuel
efficiency slowed during the 1990’s. This complicates the measurement of tax incidence and
suggests that the gasoline tax may not be as regressive as once thought. Clearly any study of
the incidence of the gasoline tax needs to consider the vehicle mix across income groups as
well as the elasticity of demand for gasoline across income groups.
Interestingly, Zupnick (1975) looked at the incidence of gasoline taxes during the 1969-70
period using annual income data (rather than consumer expenditures) and a static model that
does not account for demand responses. He found similar results to West and Proterba: that
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the gasoline tax was progressive over lower income groups and then turned regressive for
upper middle and upper income groups. Zupnick’s conclusion was that it was the middle
class that incurred the largest burden from the gasoline tax.
Finally, there was a big change in gasoline prices between the Zupnick and West study
period, and nominal gasoline prices today are much higher than those experienced in either of
the earlier periods. Today fuel taxes are small compared to the price of gasoline. Vehicle
choice and usage will depend on overall gasoline price, not the fuel tax. Thus, the
distributional effects from more recent data may be different than those from earlier studies.
The West (2005) and Proterba (1991) studies examined incidence for the entire U.S. using the
measure of consumption expenditure from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). For the
state of Oregon, however, the CES did not provide a large enough data set for this study. In
addition to income distribution, the investigators also wanted to see how a change in the road
user tax structure would change the way in which individual households traded off using
different household vehicles (in particular high- versus low-mileage vehicle use).
Information on individual vehicle usage (miles) was not available in the CES data set; only
total household mileage was given.
Thus, the investigators used the National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) as the primary
data source for this study. Data were available on individual household vehicles; however
only annual household income was available, not annual expenditures as advocated by West
and Proterba. Fortunately, Zupnick’s results indicated that the possible bias, introduced by
using annual income rather than expenditures, may not be a serious problem.

1.1.3 Geographic impact
In the state of Oregon there is a deep concern that changing from the gasoline tax to a VMT
fee will adversely impact rural areas relative to urban areas. It is usually argued that since
there are fewer transportation alternatives in rural areas, the demand for miles driven in rural
areas will likely be more inelastic than in urban areas. Changing the pricing mechanism may
thus have little (or no) impact on driving behavior in rural areas. In other words, the elasticity
of demand for vehicle miles, in response to a change in tax, is inelastic.
However, the response of VMT to changes in the cost of driving also will depend on the type
of vehicles driven in rural areas relative to urban areas. The total impact on the rural/urban
areas will depend on the number of miles driven by those impacted by a tax change.
Assuming a flat revenue-neutral VMT fee, the current 24 cents-per-gallon gasoline tax would
change to a 1.2 cents-per-mile distance-based fee. Under this VMT fee people who drive
vehicles with a fuel efficiency of less than 20 miles per gallon (mpg) would actually pay less
in road user fees than under the gasoline tax. Those who now drive vehicles with fuel
efficiency exceeding 20 mpg would pay more. Thus, the distributional impact on urban/rural
as well as high/low income groups depends in turn on what type of vehicle is used by the
different households.
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1.1.4 Impact on the Adoption of Alternative Fuel Vehicles
Finally there is concern that owners of fuel efficient vehicles would end up having to pay
more in road user fees under a VMT fee than under the current gasoline tax. Will this
discourage the use of fuel efficient vehicles, hybrids in particular?
If a vehicle gets 50 mpg, under the current Oregon gasoline tax it would be paying $0.24/50
miles or about $0.0048 (0.48 cents) per mile. This amount is 40% of the 1.2 cents per mile
estimated for a revenue-neutral VMT fee. If gasoline, exclusive of tax were $3.75 per gallon,
the 50 mpg vehicle driver would be paying 7.5 cents per mile in gasoline expense plus 0.48
cents per mile in tax, or about 7.98 cents per mile. With a VMT fee this would rise to 8.7
cents per mile, increasing the per-mile combined gasoline and tax cost of driving by 0.72
cents, about 9 percent. Recent AAA estimates of per-mile total costs of driving range
between 50 cents and 66 cents per mile; thus the 0.72 cents higher cost due to a VMT fee
would translate into less than a 2% difference in the overall driving cost per mile. Is this
enough to make people decide not to buy a hybrid?
Unfortunately, there is not yet a good enough data set available to estimate a demand function
for hybrid vehicles that would allow calculation of the price elasticity of demand for a change
of this magnitude in operating expenses. However, given the fact that this represents a very
small amount compared to the purchase price of the vehicle, it is likely that the impact would
be negligible. In fact, current sales of hybrids are taking place despite the fact that the new
vehicle price of a hybrid is often $2,000-5,000 more than the purchase price for a comparable
regular fuel vehicle.
In addition, while some hybrid vehicles get very high fuel economy (greater than 40 mpg),
others do not. In particular, many of the newer hybrids are aimed at the SUV market, and
while the fuel economy of these vehicles is higher than a comparable non-hybrid model, it is
possible that people who were driving more fuel efficient smaller cars are now buying larger
vehicles with the same mileage as their smaller car. The net result could be the same amount
of total fuel consumed, but an increase in the average size of vehicles. Such an outcome
would mirror the phenomenon observed in the 1990s: as vehicles became more fuel efficient
the vehicle mix turned more towards larger vehicles.
It should be noted that the point of hybrid subsidies is not to reduce fuel consumption in the
short run but to promote the development of a market to improve a fuel saving technology
and reduce the cost of the technology. It is also hoped that in the medium to long run it will
substantially reduce fuel consumption.
There is also the interrelated question of the distributional impact of promotion of hybrid
vehicles. West (2005) argues that policymakers have tended to try and promote the use of
hybrids through various types of subsidies such as tax credits on new cars. Since these
vehicles usually cost more and are usually purchased by those in the higher range of the
income distribution, she claims that either gasoline taxes or mile-based fees are significantly
less regressive than these subsidies.
It is, of course, possible to charge different VMT fee rates depending on the vehicle size or
passenger car equivalents (PCE). Indeed, promoters of high fuel efficiency vehicles often
suggest charging “gas guzzlers” (which are usually higher weight, larger vehicles) a higher
fee to encourage people to switch to more fuel efficient and environmentally friendly
vehicles. However, given the currently contemplated mileage fees in the 1-2 cent per mile
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range, Forkenbrock (2000) argues that “it is not clear that varying per-mile rates among types
of passenger vehicles will constitute a significant incentive to purchase and operate
environmentally friendly vehicles” (p. 97).
Figure 1.1 illustrates the impact of a change from a 24 cent-per-gallon gasoline tax to a 1.2
cent-per-mile VMT fee on drivers of vehicles with differing fuel efficiency.
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Figure 1.1: Per Mile Fuel Costs under Gas Tax and VMT Tax for Vehicles with Different Fuel

Clearly people with vehicles that get less than 20 mpg would pay less under a VMT fee and
those with vehicles attaining more than 20 mpg would pay more, but is the amount enough to
cause a significant change in behavior?
Ball (2007) in a recent Wall Street Journal article quotes Robert Socolow, professor at
Princeton University as saying that a carbon emissions cap that raises the price of gasoline by
30 cents a gallon would be “… not enough to prod many people to go out and buy a more
efficient car.” Indeed, recent increases in the retail price of gasoline have been in this range
and thus provide a unique opportunity to observe the impact on fuel efficient automobile
purchases in the next few years.

1.1.5 Other contexts in which a distance-based mileage fee has been
examined
Although there are no studies that empirically examine the use of a VMT fee for collecting
road user fees, there is a developing literature that looks at vehicle mileage fees as a
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mechanism for collecting emissions taxes. West (2005) and Parry and Small (2005) all find
the mileage fee to be a much better instrument for approximating optimal emissions fees than
a gasoline tax. Thus, a VMT fee for road users may well have the additional social benefit of
reducing emissions.
Finally, DeCorla-Souza (2001), Litman (1999, 2006), and Edlin (2002) discuss the benefits of
distance-based insurance. Greater economic efficiency can be achieved by turning fixed
costs, such as vehicle insurance, into variable costs. In theory, fixed costs are not considered
when making marginal decisions. For example, once a driver pays the insurance premium,
there is no incentive to limit the distance driven; in fact, assuming there is some utility to gain
from increasing miles driven, there is actually an incentive to drive more.
A distance-based fee gives all drivers the option to reduce miles driven and save money.
DeCorla-Souza (2001) uses social cost estimates from Delucchi (1997) to estimate the
impacts of an optional distance-based insurance program including the effect on externalities
such as pollution and accidents. He estimates that the total value of social benefits from an
optimal distance-based insurance charge program could be as large as $2,914 per mile under
congested road conditions.
Thus it is timely to provide a complete analysis of the overall socio-economic impact of
changing from the gasoline tax to a VMT fee. In addition to providing state Departments of
Transportation with a more reliable source of revenue, such a system might provide added
social benefits as described above. This study thus explores some analytical tools
policymakers might use to evaluate the socio-economic impacts.
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2.0

MODELING THE IMPACT OF A VMT FEE ON OREGON
HOUSEHOLDS

This chapter examines alternative methodologies for analyzing the impact of a change from a
gasoline tax to a VMT fee on households and regions.
The first methodology pursued is referred to as the static model. This is a method frequently
used by the U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) to evaluate the distributional
impact of changes in tax structure on households in different income groups. This method
assumes that the tax change itself will cause no behavioral response. Although this method
is known to overstate increases in tax burden and understate decreases in tax burden, the JCT
advocates this approach largely on the grounds that it is easily understood by policymakers
who may get lost in details of more complex analyses. This is particularly appropriate if the
changes are likely to be very small.
The other approaches discussed in this chapter involve models that account for behavioral
responses to changes in the cost of driving that are caused by the change in tax structure.
Three econometric modeling approaches are found particularly suitable for this objective:
multiple regression analysis, a simultaneous equation model, and a discrete-continuous
choice model. These models vary in their behavioral realism, data requirements, and policy
sensitivity.
This chapter begins the discussion of the alternative econometric approaches with a review of
the modeling objectives. Following this is a review of previous research on vehicle ownership
and use models. The chapter concludes with a summary of the advantages and disadvantages
of each approach.

2.1

MODELING OBJECTIVES

Given the current Oregon state gasoline tax of $0.24 per gallon, drivers pay different amounts
of taxes per mile driven due to variations in vehicle fuel efficiency (i.e., miles per gallon). A
1.2 cents-per-mile VMT fee would result in a revenue-neutral change under the assumption
that the average vehicle in Oregon has a 20 miles-per-gallon (mpg) fuel efficiency.
Therefore, under such a VMT fee the effective fuel cost per mile including taxes would
increase for a vehicle with fuel efficiency greater than 20 mpg and decrease for a vehicle with
fuel efficiency less than 20 mpg.
According to the standard microeconomic demand theory, a change in fuel cost per mile can
be expected to induce a range of behavioral responses from Oregon households. In the near
term, households may change their total number of trips, destinations, modes, routes, and the
relative use of different household vehicles (if the households have more than one type of
vehicle, e.g., a car and an SUV). In the medium term, households can change both the
number and the type of vehicles they own. In the long term, per-mile fuel cost changes may
even affect households’ residential and employment location decisions, though such
relocation effects should not be very significant.
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The near-term and medium-term potential demand responses can be divided into two
categories: changes in vehicle use (measured by vehicle miles driven) and changes in vehicle
ownership (number and type of vehicles). It should be noted that these demand responses are
interrelated. For instance, an increase in the fuel cost per mile should cause a household to
drive less in the short run. However, if the household decides to purchase new vehicles with
lower fuel costs per mile sometime in the future, the total household vehicle use could
increase again; (this is the “rebound” effect of increasing fuel efficiency).
It is also expected that a change to a VMT fee would not affect all Oregon households the
same. First, different households exhibit dissimilar vehicle ownership characteristics. The
impact of a flat-rate VMT fee on households that primarily own fuel efficient vehicles should
differ from the impact on households that primarily own pickup trucks and SUVs. In
addition, households with multiple vehicles and multiple vehicle types can switch their
vehicle use more towards the vehicle(s) with relatively lower fuel cost per mile.
Second, households with lower incomes are likely to be more sensitive to per-mile fuel cost
changes. Third, households living in different regions can respond differently to changes in
fuel cost per mile. For instance, it is often argued that rural households drive more than urban
households due to different land use patterns. Urban residents also enjoy better public transit
services and more destination options than their rural counterparts. Consequently, urban
households could more easily adjust their travel behavior if a VMT fee were implemented.
The distributional effects of the VMT fee are therefore multifold, which imposes challenges
on model capabilities.
The purpose of this study is to provide the necessary analytical tools to compare the
incidence of a VMT fee to the incidence of the current per-gallon gasoline tax. The modeling
objective is therefore to quantify the vehicle ownership and use changes for different
household groups in response to the conversion from the gasoline tax to a flat-rate VMT fee.
It is also desirable that the models developed in this project can estimate the demand
responses to graduated (i.e., variable-rate) VMT fees (by location, by fuel efficiency, etc.).
Results from the modeling can be used in policy analysis to estimate the distributional effects
of various VMT fee structures.
Data availability is an important issue for all empirical modeling work. A summary of data
availability and a detailed description of the main data source – the National Household
Travel Survey (NHTS) – are presented in the following chapter. It is sufficient here to note
that the ability to successfully estimate all of the models discussed in this chapter depends
critically on the availability of requisite data.

2.2

REVIEW OF PREVIOUS VEHICLE OWNERSHIP AND USE
MODELS

Choices of automobile ownership and use have been extensively studied by economists, land
use and transportation planners, public policy analysts, environmental protection agencies,
and automobile manufacturers. Models of vehicle ownership and use have been successfully
developed and applied in previous research to conduct a variety of important planning and
policy analyses:

12

1. Estimating the impact of fuel efficiency regulations and technologies on automobile
ownership and use patterns (Goldberg 1998; Greene, et al. 1999; Small and Van
Dender 2006);
2. Analyzing the automobile demand and travel demand responses to gasoline price
changes (Haughton and Sarkar 1996; Puller and Greening 1997); Bento, et al. 2005;
Bomberg and Kockelman 2006);
3. Assessing the overall and distributional effects of mileage-based vehicle pollution
control policies and emissions taxes (Walls and Hanson 1999; West 2004);
4. Estimating the benefits from mileage-based vehicle insurance (DeCorla-Souza 2001);
5. Forecasting future demands for various types of automobiles (often conducted by
automobile manufactures);
6. Forecasting future automobile use, level of congestion, and mobile-source emission
levels for land use development and transportation investment analysis (conducted by
states and Metropolitan Planning Organizations).
Earlier research on automobile demand (number and type) employed aggregate models
developed from national or state-level time series data (Chow 1957; Kain and Beesley 1965;
Mogridge 1967; Chamberlain 1974). Although aggregate demand models are useful in
forecasting future aggregate vehicle shares by types, they ignore the impact of distinct
household characteristics (e.g., income, size, location) on automobile demand, and do not
consider individual households’ choices of vehicle ownership or use.
Small and Van Dender (2006) have developed a simultaneous equation model (SEM) of
vehicle fleet size, fuel efficiency, and vehicle use choices at the state level using a U.S. panel
data set. Their model consists of three simultaneous regression equations (i.e., the dependent
variable in one equation is also the independent variable in one or more other equations,
allowing simultaneous or two-way influences); it is used to estimate the rebound effect of
fuel efficiency standards. Their SEM model could be adapted to conduct household-level
vehicle ownership and use analysis under certain assumptions.
A disaggregate modeling paradigm is necessary for this project because of the project focus
on the distributional effects at the household level. Therefore, aggregate demand models that
group households by large spatial analysis units (e.g., cities, states, nations) were not further
reviewed by the research team.
Discrete choice models enable a disaggregate level of analysis and have dominated recent
vehicle ownership studies (i.e., studies on the number and type of vehicles chosen by
individual households). The majority of vehicle ownership models rely on multinomial,
ordered, or nested logit specifications. Various vehicle ownership indicators have been
estimated by the discrete choice models, including the following:
•
•
•

the choice of the most recent vehicle purchased (Lave and Train 1979; Kitamura, et al.
2000);
the make, model, and vintage of the household vehicle holdings (Manski and Sherman
1980);
the vehicle that is most driven (Choo and Mokhtarian 2004);
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•
•
•

the joint choice of vehicle number/make/model/vintage (Berkovec 1985);
the joint choice of vehicle make/model/vintage and vehicle acquisition type (Mannering,
et al. 2002); and
the joint choice of vehicle type and vehicle age (Berkovec and Rust 1985;
Mohammadian, et al. 2003).

Bhat and Pulugurta (1998) compared a multinomial logit model to an ordered logit model
when estimating a household’s total number of vehicles owned, and they found that the
multinomial logit model had better performance. The significant explanatory variables used
in these vehicle ownership models were reviewed by Choo and Mokhtarian (2004) including
vehicle price, vehicle operating and maintenance cost, fuel cost, household size, income,
household composition (numbers of workers, adults, children, etc.), location, residential
density, transit accessibility, household head’s characteristics (age, gender, education, etc.),
and vehicle characteristics (fuel efficiency, passenger/cargo capacity, head room, shoulder
room, etc.). Given the complexity of these models, they required an extensive data base to
provide robust results.
Vehicle use, measured by vehicle miles traveled (VMT), is frequently analyzed with
regression models. Most of these regression models are developed for household-level
analysis, with annual household VMT being the dependent variable, and with fuel cost,
household socio-demographic factors, and vehicle characteristics being the explanatory
variables (Mannering and Winston 1985; Train 1986; Bhat and Sen 2004; West 2004).
Greene, et al. (1999) developed a vehicle-level VMT model for households with multiple
vehicles. Their model estimates the use of a particular vehicle as a function of the use of other
vehicles owned by the same household. This model specification considers the possibility
that a household may drive a specific vehicle more when the relative driving costs of
individual household vehicles change due to exogenous factors. For instance, when fuel cost
increases, a household that owns a car and a truck may choose to use the car more often to
reduce the total household fuel expenditure. Mannering and Winston (1985) show empirically
that the elasticity of household VMT with respect to fuel cost per mile is significantly higher
(in terms of the absolute value) for one-vehicle households than for multiple-vehicle
households, which suggests that there is substitution among multiple household vehicles .
It is important for vehicle ownership and use studies to recognize that households choose
jointly the number of vehicles to own, the type of each household vehicle, and the amount
each vehicle is driven. Households that expect to have high levels of vehicle use are more
likely to own multiple vehicles and more likely to own fuel efficient vehicles. Households’
vehicle number and type choices in turn constrain day-to-day vehicle use decisions. As
households choose to own more vehicles, the variety-seeking behavior in vehicle type
choices also becomes more apparent. Therefore, instead of estimating vehicle ownership and
vehicle use separately, more advanced models should jointly consider the discrete vehicle
ownership choices and the continuous vehicle use choices.
Most previous joint vehicle ownership and use models are variants of the discrete-continuous
choice model developed by Dubin and McFadden (1984). Originally, the discrete-continuous
choice model was used to simultaneously estimate the demand for and the usage of electrical
appliances. The model is derived from a single indirect utility function and thus enjoys a solid
microeconomic theoretical foundation. Those who have subsequently applied the Dubin and
McFadden approach for estimating vehicle ownership and use include Mannering and
Winston (1985), Train (1986), Berkowitxz(1990), Hensher, et al. (1992), Goldberg (1998),
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West (2004), and Bento, et al. (2005). In these joint choice models, the discrete vehicle
number choices (no vehicle, one vehicle, two vehicles, etc.) and type choices (car, SUV,
minivan, pickup truck, etc.) are considered with multinomial logit or nested logit
specifications, and the continuous vehicle use choices (vehicle miles driven) are modeled
with regression equations.
The discrete-continuous model specification allows each of the three vehicle-related choice
dimensions (number, type, and use) to influence the other two choice dimensions through
hierarchical choice structures, inclusive values, and correction terms. Mannering and Hensher
(1987) note that full-information maximum likelihood estimation should produce unbiased
coefficient estimates for discrete-continuous choice models simultaneously, while sequential
estimation procedures are easier to implement in practice.
Although the standard discrete-continuous choice model has a strong behavioral foundation
and good policy sensitivity, Bhat and Sen (2004) have documented several theoretical and
practical issues associated with the previous discrete-continuous modeling approaches. First
of all, these approaches do not recognize that households own a mixture of vehicle types to
satisfy different functional needs (e.g., transporting people, transporting household goods,
vacation travel). The diminishing marginal returns in using a single vehicle type cannot be
handled by the standard vehicle-type discrete choice models. They have also noted that due
to the large number of different vehicle types, enumerating all possible vehicle type bundles a
household may choose from can cause an explosion in the number of alternatives in the
choice set (e.g., m vehicles, n makers, p models for each maker, and q vintages result in
m·n·p·q vehicle bundles). This limitation makes it difficult in the analysis to include
households owning more than two vehicles.
Zhao and Kockelman (2000) and West (2004) also mention the problem of large choice sets.
One remedy is to combine multiple vehicle bundles with small sample sizes into a single
larger vehicle bundle, so that the total number of choice alternatives can be reduced and
becomes more manageable. Finally, modeling the continuous dimension of vehicle use could
be cumbersome in the standard discrete-continuous choice model because in theory a number
of regression equations need to be individually specified and estimated for households with
different vehicle number and type combinations. But it should be noted that West (2004) only
estimated a one-size-fits-all vehicle use model for all households in her study, and that Train
(1986) estimated two vehicle use models for households with one vehicle and two vehicles
respectively. Their models appear to provide satisfactory statistical significance and
reasonable forecasts.
Recognizing the limitations of the standard discrete-continuous choice models, Bhat, et al.
(2004) applied the multiple discrete-continuous extreme value (MDCEV) model to vehicle
ownership and use research. The MDCEV model is still based on the canonical utilitymaximization theory, but considers the diminishing returns in owning and using multiple
vehicles of the same type. It assumes that households maximize utility by jointly choosing the
number of vehicles to own in each vehicle type category (car, SUV, minivan, truck), and the
annual miles of use of each owned vehicle type. To enable the subsequent simulated
maximum likelihood estimation, it is also assumed that the total household annual vehicle
miles driven is fixed and given, which makes the MDCEV model, in its present form, more
appropriate for estimating long-term household vehicle fleet changes than for short-term
vehicle use changes. It is interesting to note that some empirical evidence suggests that
households tend to respond to fuel cost changes by owning different types of vehicles instead
of changing vehicle use (Small 1999).
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Household vehicle ownership models have also been developed outside the discrete choice
framework. Zhao and Kockelman (2000) proposed a multivariate negative binomial (MNB)
model to investigate households’ distinctions in vehicle purchases among passenger cars,
SUVs, pickups, and minivans. This model structure is capable of capturing unobserved
heterogeneity across the vehicle ownership levels and is equivalent to a multinomial
distribution of the combinations of vehicles owned, conditioned on a negative binomial of the
total vehicles owned. The model has been successfully estimated with the 1995 National
Personal Travel Survey data. Compared to standard discrete choice models, the MNB vehicle
ownership model does not require the enumeration of all possible vehicle type bundles.
However, the MNB model does not provide a direct welfare measure, and it is harder to
integrate with continuous vehicle use models.

2.3

RECOMMENDED MODELING APPROACHES

The research team considered the following modeling approaches for this project (all at the
household level):
1. The static model which assumes no behavioral response;
2. Multiple regression model of vehicle use with fixed vehicle ownership;
3. Simultaneous equation model of vehicle fleet size, fuel efficiency, and vehicle use
decisions; and
4. Discrete-continuous choice model of joint vehicle number, type, and use choices.
All of these approaches differ in their underlying behavioral assumptions, functional forms,
data requirements, model capabilities, and policy sensitivity. However, only the latter three
are capable of estimating demand responses to the conversion from the per-gallon fuel tax to
a VMT fee. All of the models can be used to assess the impact of this policy change on
individual households or household groups.
Note that commercial truck trips will not be considered by any of these models. The reason
is that in the state of Oregon heavy trucks already pay a weight-mile tax and thus would not
face any change in user fees as a result of the policy change being analyzed.
The specification, estimation, validation, and implementation of the recommended models
are discussed in detail in the following sections, as well as the methods for applying the
model results to analyze the distributional effects of a VMT fee.

2.3.1 The static model
The static model assumes no behavioral changes by vehicle owners in response to the change
in tax, which essentially assumes that the price elasticity of demand for miles is zero. These
measures are calculated assuming that all vehicle drivers drive exactly the same vehicles for
exactly the same distances both before and after the change in tax structure. Since this
method ignores the demand responses that are likely to occur in response to the change in
driving cost caused by a change to a VMT fee, these figures will overstate the projected
impacts of the change in tax structure.
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The first step is to calculate the total household expenditures on gasoline under the gasoline
tax and then again under a 1.2 cents-per-mile VMT fee.
For the gasoline tax the number of miles driven by the household (MILES) is divided by the
weighted average fuel efficiency for the household vehicles (average miles per gallon, MPG),
to get the number of gallons of gasoline purchased by the household (GALLONS).

GALLONS =

MILES
MPG

(2-1)

To get total expenditures (GASTOTEX) under the gasoline tax, the number of gallons
(GALLONS) is multiplied by the average price paid for fuel (PGAS), where PGAS includes
the current gasoline tax of 24 cents per gallon.
GASTOTEX = (PGAS)(GALLONS)

(2-2)

The calculation for total expenditures under a vehicle miles traveled (VMT) fee of 1.2 cents
per mile is made by taking the current gas price (PGAS) and subtracting the 24 cents per
gallon gasoline tax to get the net price of gasoline, NETPGAS:

NETPGAS= PGAS− 0.24

(2-3)

Then NETPGAS is multiplied by the number of gallons for the household (GALLONS), and
the amount spent on the VMT fee is added in by multiplying 1.2 times the number of miles
(MILES) driven:
VMTTOTEX = NETPGAS • GALLONS + 0.012 • MILES

(2-4)

The net change in household expenditures is the difference between household expenditures
under the two tax regimes:
EXCHANGE=VMTTOTEX–GASTOTEX

(2-5)

A negative value for EXCHANGE indicates that the change to a VMT fee will reduce
household expenditures on gasoline and road tax; a positive value indicates an increase in
expenditures when switching to the VMT fee.
The incidence of household expenditures on gasoline and tax is defined as a percent of
household income (INCOME):
For the gasoline tax:
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GASTOTEX / INCOME
For the VMT fee:
VMTTOTEX / INCOME
The formula to measure the incidence of just the gasoline tax (TOTALGASTAX) is shown as:
TOTALGASTAX 0.24GALLONS
=
INCOME
INCOME

(2-6)

The formula to measure the incidence of the VMT fee (TOTALVMTTAX) is shown as:
TOTALVMTTAX 0.012MILES
=
INCOME
INCOME

(2-7)

However, these two measures will yield very small numbers, as the tax totals alone are a very
small percent of income.
To derive an incidence measure for the aggregate of households in various groups (such as
income or rural/urban groups), one simply aggregates relevant measure over households in
the group. So, for instance, a measure of the incidence of gasoline taxes by income group j,
is the sum of the total gas tax paid by each of the i households in income group j:
I

TOTALGASTAXi
INCOMEi
i=1

∑

2.3.2 Multiple regression model (OLS regression)
Without considering vehicle quantity and type choices, one can focus on the changes in the
usage and relative usage of existing household vehicles due to a change to a VMT fee. In the
short run, vehicle use changes result from households adjusting trip frequencies, trip chains,
destinations, modes, vehicle occupancies, and routes. In the long run, location choices (e.g.,
relocation to areas closer to work/non-work destinations, or to areas with better transit
services and bike/pedestrian-facilities) may also shift vehicle use patterns. The total vehicle
use at the household level, measured by the total annual vehicle miles driven on all vehicles,
should be a function of the per-mile driving cost, income, location, current vehicle
ownership, and other relevant household characteristics. The per-mile driving cost borne by a
household contains vehicle depreciation cost, operating cost, maintenance cost, insurance
cost, and fuel cost including all applicable taxes. However, fuel cost per mile is the only cost
variable included in the regression model, because the other cost components are influenced
by vehicle quantity and type choices (assumed to be fixed in this case) and fuel cost per mile
is the only cost component that will be affected by a change to a VMT fee.
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The multiple regression model states that the total miles driven by a household (M) is a
function of the fuel cost per mile (PM), household income (I), household location (U), number
of vehicles currently owned by the household (V), and a vector of other household
characteristics (HHM).

M = f ( PM , I , U , V , HH M )

(2-8)

Fuel cost per mile for household vehicle v (PM,v) is determined by the fuel price without state
gasoline tax (PF, $/gallon), vehicle fuel efficiency (E, miles per gallon), state gasoline tax
(TG, if any, $/gallon), and VMT fee (TM, if any, $/mile):
PF + TG
+ TM
E

PM ,v =

(2-9)

If a household owns multiple vehicles, PM is defined as the weighted average of all household
vehicles with the miles driven on individual vehicles (Mv) being the weights.

PM

2.3.2.1

∑
=

V
v =1

( M v • PM ,v )
M

(2-10)

Model specification

The model in Equation 2-8 can be specified as a simple linear regression model with
total miles driven being the dependent variable. However, a log-log functional form
has been shown to be superior in previous research and would allow easier
computation of demand elasticities:
ln M = β1 + β 2 ln PM + β 3 ln I + β 4 ln U + β 5 ln V

+ β 6 (ln I • ln PM ) + β 7 (ln U • ln PM ) + β8 (ln V • ln PM ) + β • ln ( HH M )

(2-11)

where:
ln(.) is the natural logarithm function,
M is total household miles driven,
I is household income,
Pm is the weighted average household fuel cost per mile,
U is the urban/rural location indicator,
V is the number of vehicles in the household, and
HH is a vector of household characteristics.
Demand elasticity (e) is defined as the percentage change of total household vehicle
miles driven due to a one percent increase of fuel cost per mile:
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e=

ΔM / M
∂M PM
=
•
= β 2 + β 6 ln I + β 7 ln L + β8 ln V
ΔPM / PM ∂PM M

(2-12)

For instance, if e is equal to –1.5 for a particular household, it implies that a one
percent increase in fuel cost per mile will cause this household to reduce their total
annual miles driven by 1.5 percent. The three interaction terms (the 6th, 7th and 8th
terms) on the right hand side of the regression equation allow the demand elasticity
with respect to fuel cost per mile to vary among households with different income,
location, and vehicle ownership. It is expected that households with higher income
(low price elasticity in general), living in rural areas (fewer travel options and lower
density land use patterns), and owning more vehicles (possible substitutions among
multiple household vehicles) to be less sensitive to changes in fuel cost per mile and
therefore have lower demand elasticities. Without the interaction terms in Equation 211, all households in Oregon would be effectively assumed to have the same
sensitivity to fuel cost changes, an obviously unreasonable assumption.
Although household income and vehicle ownership data were readily available in
various data sources, it was less straightforward to define household location.
Decision makers in Oregon were interested in the potentially different impacts of the
VMT fee on urban and rural households. However, the National Household Travel
Survey (NHTS) dataset only provided a crude urban/rural indicator variable.
Aside from income, location, and vehicle ownership, other household characteristics
can also significantly affect total vehicle miles driven, including household size,
household composition (number of workers, adults, children, etc.), and household
head characteristics (age, gender, education, etc.). These socio-demographic variables
were available to the research team, to be considered in subsequent model
development stages.

2.3.2.2

Model estimation and validation

The multiple regression model was estimated from the NHTS data using ordinary
least square techniques. After coefficients were empirically derived, the modelestimated and observed household vehicle miles driven were compared for model
validation purposes. It would be desirable to use an independent validation dataset;
however, the NHTS 2001 dataset only included 348 valid household observations in
Oregon. The research team addressed this issue of small sample size in two ways.
First, a cluster analysis was conducted to identify states that had similar travel and
vehicle ownership characteristics. Second, a number of sensitivity tests were
conducted on the estimated model to ensure the regression model produced
reasonable forecasts. The validity of the regression model was tested by arbitrarily
changing independent variables (fuel price, fuel efficiency, income, household size,
etc.) and observing the estimated changes in the dependent variable (total vehicle
miles driven).

2.3.2.3

Model implementation and the distributional effects of a VMT fee

A VMT fee would lead to a change of fuel cost per mile in the regression equation (211) according to the definition of fuel cost per mile in Equation (2-9). The fuel cost
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per mile with the existing gasoline tax is PM,Before=(PF+0.24)/E, and changes to
PM,After=(0.012+PF/E) under a $0.012/mile flat-rate VMT fee. The total miles driven
by any household in the sample before (MBefore) and after (MAfter) a change to a VMT
fee can be computed from the regression model. The total fuel-related payment (F)
and total road use fee payment (T) by each household would be:
FBefore = PM , Before • M Before ;

TBefore =

0.24
• M Before ;
E

FAfter = PM , After • M Before

(2-13)

TAfter = 0.02 • M After

These results at the individual household level can be easily aggregated into
household groups by income, location, vehicle ownership, and other household
characteristics, which can show the distributional impact of a $0.012/mile VMT fee
on various types of households in Oregon. The distributional effects of graduated or
variable VMT fee structures could be evaluated in a similar fashion, except that the
changes in fuel cost per mile would depend on the actual rate structure.

2.3.3 Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM)
The regression model discussed in Section 2.3.2 has several advantages. It is relatively easy
to estimate, has minimum data requirements, and provides good policy sensitivity (i.e., is
capable of evaluating various mile tax rate structures). However, the regression model makes
the strong behavioral assumption that households would respond to a change to a VMT fee
by changing vehicle use only. This assumption may not be as unrealistic as many might
think, because the fuel cost changes due to a VMT fee are expected to be quite small. One
could argue that vehicle purchase decisions are unlikely to be affected by small fuel cost
changes. However, empirical evidence suggests that in responses to fuel price spikes,
households often change their vehicle types rather than reduce their total vehicle use (Small
1999, Kockelman 2006). Mannering and Winston (1985) find that the long-run vehicle use
elasticity with respect to operating cost changes are significantly smaller than the short-run
elasticity, also suggesting vehicle ownership changes.
The simultaneous equation model presented in this section recognizes that households choose
the number of vehicles to own (V), the average fuel efficiency of household vehicles (E), and
the total vehicle miles driven (M) simultaneously (i.e., the three choices are interdependent)
when fuel cost per mile changes. The actual model identification is provided in Equation Set
2-14. To capture the interdependencies of vehicle ownership and use decisions, these three
variables enter the equation set as both dependent and independent variables.
V = f ( M , PV , PF , I , U , HH V )
E = g ( M , V , ΔPV , PF , I , U , HH E )
M = h (V , PM ( PF , E ), I , U , HH M )

Vehicle number choice (V) is a function of vehicle use (M), average purchase price of
vehicles (PV), fuel price (PF), household income (I), location (U), and other household
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(2-14)

characteristics (HHV, e.g., number of workers, household size, number of children, household
head’s age, gender, and education). Vehicle fuel efficiency (E) is a function of vehicle use
(M), number of vehicles (V), difference in the purchase price of fuel efficient and fuel
inefficient vehicles (ΔPV), price of fuel (PF), income (I), location (U), and other household
characteristics (HHE; a different subscript is used because it is possible that a different set of
other household characteristics may influence vehicle fuel efficiency choices). Finally,
vehicle miles driven (M) is a function of the number of household vehicles (V) and fuel cost
per mile (PM), which is a function of fuel price and fuel efficiency, income (I), location (U),
and other household characteristics (HHM).
The actual specification of each of the three functions is similar to the log-log specification in
Equation 2-11 in Section 2.3.2. Again, the income, location, and vehicle quantity variables
were interacted with fuel cost variables to allow different demand elasticities across
households. Compared to the multiple regression model, the SEM model required additional
information about vehicle price, which was collected by the research team from standard
vehicle price database and the 2001 Ward’s Automotive Yearbook (Wards 2001).
In order to apply standard estimation procedures for SEM models such as the three-stage
least square method, it is necessary to consider vehicle quantity as a continuous variable. The
estimated vehicle quantity will be rounded into the nearest integer values. This rounding
process will not affect the validity of the vehicle type and use forecasts. Similar to the
regression model in Section 2.3.2, the SEM model will produce estimates of household
vehicle miles driven before and after a change to a VMT fee. However, the SEM estimates
represent the long-run vehicle use adjustment with vehicle quantity and type changes already
taken into account, while the regression model estimates represent the short-run vehicle use
changes with fixed vehicle quantity and type. The SEM estimates, therefore, can be expected
to be smaller than the regression mode estimates. In other words, if a VMT fee has a negative
impact on a particular household, the negative impact will be overestimated by the regression
model.
Among the software packages that are capable of estimating SEM models, the research team
chose STATA.

2.3.4 Discrete-Continuous Choice (DCC) Model
Discrete choice models or qualitative choice models predict the decisions made by an
individual (vehicle ownership choice, mode choice, vehicle use, etc.) as a function of a
number of factors which seem to influence the decision making process. The individual is
presumed to have made the choice from a discrete set. Discrete choice models are widely
used to predict the mode choice of individuals in transportation modeling. The most
prominent discrete choice models used currently include logit, generalized extreme value,
probit, and mixed logit. These models can effectively analyze the variables which are not
continuous but still vary over time. Regression models on the other hand can effectively
analyze the continuous variables.
When an individual is provided with two qualitative choices such as the number of cars to
own or the number of miles to drive, the first choice is between a discrete set of alternatives
say 0, 1 or 2. The second choice is among a continuous set of alternatives such as any
number of miles. A discrete choice model can be used to estimate the first choice but cannot
estimate the second one. Thus, in most of the studies which have used this approach the
vehicle number choice was estimated using a discrete choice model and then vehicle use
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(miles traveled) was estimated using linear regression. In this case we need both a discrete
and continuous model to (Train 1993). Hence, a combination of these two models known as
the discrete-continuous choice model can be used here.
The discrete-continuous choice model was introduced by Dubin and McFadden (1984) when
they suggested that, in order to estimate the demand for electricity, a derived demand, one has
to simultaneously estimate the demand for the durables that ultimately drive the demand for
energy.
Sarah E. West (2001) used this approach to examine the distributional effects of vehicle
pollution control policies by estimating the joint demand for vehicles and miles. Train (1993)
estimated the demand for cars and light trucks while taking into account the interdependence
between the number of vehicles a household chooses to own and the type chosen.
Mohammadian and Miller (2003) developed a household automobile type choice model at a
disaggregate level to estimate the consumer demand for personal-use vehicles given the
available choices. Mannering and Winston (1985) used this approach to analyze the impact of
vehicle ownership on the utilization. Other people who have used this approach include Lave
and Train (1979) and Berkowitz (1990).
The simultaneous equation model (SEM) relies on more realistic behavioral assumptions than
the multiple regression model. The SEM model requires, however, that vehicle quantity be
considered as a continuous variable. The fact is that vehicle quantities are indeed discrete
integer variables (0, 1, 2, 3 …), and the discrete-continuous choice (DCC) model is able to
deal with these variables. The drawback is that it also has increased data requirements and
involves greater model complexity. The following sections describe the discrete and the
continuous components in a standard DCC model.

2.3.4.1

Discrete choices of vehicle quantity and type

Vehicle quantity (V: 0, 1, 2, 3 …) and vehicle type (T: car, SUV, minivan, pickup
truck) are both discrete variables in the DCC model. A household chooses how many
cars to own (V) based on the expected vehicle use ( M ), the average vehicle price on
the market (PV), fuel price (PF), income (I), location (U), and other household
characteristics (HHV). If a household chooses to own only one vehicle, the household
then needs to choose the vehicle type (T) from the four available types based on the
average price of vehicles by type (PV,T), the average fuel cost per mile by vehicle type
(PM,T), income (I), location (U), and other household characteristics (HHT), as shown
in Equation 2-15.

(

V = f M , PV , PF , I , U , HH V , ρV

)

T = g ( PV ,T , PM ,T , I , U , HH T , ρT )

(2-15)

If a household chooses to own multiple vehicles, T should be interpreted as vehicle
bundles (e.g. car-car, car-SUV, car-minivan-pickup). The number of possible vehicle
bundles increases exponentially as the number of household vehicles increases. This
issue can be partially addressed by excluding households with more than three
vehicles from the analysis and by combining vehicle bundles with few observations

23

into larger bundles. (Excluding households with more than three vehicles would result
in only a small loss in the total number of observations, according to the NHTS 2001
Oregon sample.)
Due to the categorical nature of the dependent variables, these two functions can be
specified either as two interrelated multinomial logit models, or as a single nested
logit model. Standard statistical tests (Dubin and McFadden 1984; Ben-Akiva and
Lerman 1985) can facilitate the selection between the two alternative specifications.
ΡV is either a correction term (if quantity and type choices are specified as non-nested
choices) or the inclusive value from the lower-level vehicle type choice nest (if
quantity and type choices are specified as nested choices). ΡT is a correction term that
considers the different numbers of make/models in alternative vehicle bundles. (e.g.,
there are more car models than minivan models, and therefore, all other things equal,
households are more likely to purchase a car due to the large selection). The
correction terms can be computed by an approximation method developed in
McFadden (1978).
Multinomial and nested logit models can be estimated by several commercial
software packages including LIMDEP and GAUSS. The research team preferred
LIMDEP due to its low cost ($795 for an academic license) and its special focus on
models of categorical variables.

2.3.4.2

Continuous choice of vehicle use

Given the choices of vehicle quantity and vehicle types, households then choose how
many miles to drive in each vehicle. The simplest approach is to estimate a single
multiple regression model of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) at the household level
(West 2004), i.e., a household-level VMT use model. Another approach is to estimate
vehicle miles driven at the individual vehicle level for households with different
numbers of vehicles separately (Train 1986), i.e., a vehicle-level VMT model. The
specification of the household-level vehicle use model is similar to the regression
model in Section 2.3.2:
M (V ,T ) = f ( PM (V ,T ) , I , U , V , HH M , ρV ,T )

(2-16)

The subscript (V,T) implies that the variables are conditional on the vehicle quantity
and type choices in the discrete choice model. A correction term, ρV,T, is necessary to
ensure the consistency of coefficient estimates, because the random error term in the
vehicle use equation is expected to be correlated with vehicle type choices. This
correction term can be computed using choice probabilities from the vehicle quantity
and type choice models (Dubin and McFadden 1984).
If a household chooses not to own automobiles, a vehicle use model is obviously not
needed. If a household owns one vehicle, the household- and vehicle-level VMT
models are equivalent. For households choosing to own multiple vehicles, there exist
substitutional effects between household vehicles, which may be better captured by
vehicle-level VMT models. For instance, a fuel price increase can make the fuel-
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efficient vehicle in a multiple-vehicle household more attractive, and subsequently
driven more, while the use of other household vehicles decreases.
Let i and j denote vehicles in a household. The miles driven on vehicle i should be a
function of the fuel cost per mile of vehicle i, and the fuel cost per mile of all other
household vehicles (For all j ≠ i):
M i = h ( PM ,i , PM,j, I , U , HH M )

(2-17)

The estimation, validation, and implementation procedures for the vehicle-level VMT
model are the same as those for the household-level VMT models.

2.3.4.3

Using the Discrete-Continuous Choice Model for policy analysis

The DCC model estimates the probability that a household would choose to own a
specific number of vehicles (p(v)), and conditional on the vehicle quantity choice, the
probability that the household chooses to own a particular vehicle type bundle (p(t|v)),
and conditional on vehicle quantity and type choices, the vehicle miles driven by the
household in each vehicle (Mi|t,v). Therefore, the expected total miles driven by the
household (M) according to the DCC model is:
V

T

I

M = ∑∑∑ ⎡⎣( Mi t , v ) • p ( t v ) • p ( v ) ⎤⎦

(2-18)

v =1 t =1 i =1

The distributional effects of a VMT fee can then be estimated. The subsequent steps
for policy analysis are similar to those of the original regression model in Section
2.3.2.

2.4

SUMMARY OF THE RECOMMENDED MODELING
APPROACHES

Table 2.1 summarizes the properties of the recommended modeling approaches in three
categories: behavioral realism, policy sensitivity, and practicality.
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Table 2.1: Summary of the recommended models
Static
Model

Multiple
Regression

Simultaneous
Equations

Poor

Average

Good

DiscreteContinuous
Choice
Great

1.1. Consider changes in total vehicle use?

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

1.2. Consider changes in the distribution of
vehicle uses among multiple vehicles?

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

1.3. Consider changes in vehicle quantity choice?

No

No

Yes

Yes

1.4. Consider changes in vehicle type choice?

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Good

Good

Average

Good

2.1. Consider the distributional effects?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

2.2. Able to evaluate flat-rate mileage taxes?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

RECOMMENDED MODELS
MODEL PROPERTIES
1. Behavioral Realism

1.5. Recognize the discrete nature of vehicle type
and quantity choices?
2. Policy Sensitivity

2.3 Able to evaluate mileage tax rates
differentiated based on location?
2.4. Able to evaluate mileage tax rates
differentiated based on fuel efficiency?
2.5. Able to evaluate mileage tax rates
differentiated based on congestion?
3. Practicality

No

No

No

No

Great

Great

Good

Average

3.1 Data Availability

Good

Good

Good

Poor

3.2 Ease of Estimation

Great

Great

Good

Average

3.3 Results can be easily interpreted

Great

Great

Good

Good
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3.0 DATA
The 2001 National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) was the main data source for this
study. This survey was conducted by the United States Department of Transportation and the
Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
Within the NHTS data set, there were five files: household, vehicle, persons, daily trips and
long trips. All of the variables used in the empirical estimation for the modeling came from
the household and vehicle files. For Oregon the number of observations for each of these files
in 2001 is shown in table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Oregon sample from 2001 NHTS
Number Of Observations
File
Total
Urban
Rural
Household
407
295
112
Vehicle
893
588
305

Although there were 407 Oregon households in the NHTS, the number of households
included in each part of the analysis for this study varied depending on whether every
household had complete data for the model. When a household did not have a complete data
set, it was dropped from that part of the analysis.

3.1

DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES USED

3.1.1 Urban/rural
Urban and rural indicators in the NHTS are based on Census classifications. According to the
Census, urban is defined as having more than 1,000 people per square mile in their city or
town and more than 500 people per square mile in surrounding areas. All other areas are
defined as rural. The models used an urban/rural dummy variable with a value of one when
the household was located in an urban area, zero otherwise.

3.1.2 Household income and income groups
There are two variables in the NHTS that refer to household income - HHFAMINC and
HHINCTTL. The former leaves blank those household members whose income was not
stated. HHINCTTL randomly assigns those blanks a value within the range of those
household members whose income was recorded. This study used HHFAMINC to create the
household income variable. This income variable therefore likely understated the true
household income value for some households.
Since each household only indicated an income range rather than a level of income, this study
assigned each household the median income value for their income group. This approach
was not optimal, but it was all that could be done with the data, and it followed others who
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have used similar data sets with similar measures of income (Zupnick 1978; Lee 2000). For
the exact methodology used in assigning income to individual households, see Appendix A.
Table 3.2 below compares the distribution of incomes groups in both the Census and the
NHTS data set. Eight groups are listed here to give a better illustration of the actual
distribution relative to the Census. From these categories, this study divided the NHTS
sample into the six income groups for the analysis.
Table 3.2: Sample representation as compared to the Oregon Census 2000
% of Sample –
% of Sample Income Range ($)
Census
NHTS
<10,000
8.6
5.17
10,000~14,999
6.5
6.55
15,000~24,999
13.4
14.83
25,000~34,999
13.9
13.10
35,000~49,999
17.7
21.72
50,000~74,999
20.2
18.62
75,000~99,999
9.7
12.41
100,000+
10
3.10

The highest income group is defined as a household with income greater than or equal to
$100,000. The Oregon 2000 Census reported that only 1.8% of all Oregon households had an
income greater than $200,000 (with no upper bound). Thus, this study used $200,000 as an
upper bound for the highest income group and assigned these households a household income
value of $150,000.
Previous studies on VMT demand suggest using household expenditures in place of income
as a measure of well-being (West 2002; Walls and Hansen 1999). However, household
expenditure data was not available

3.1.3 Fuel cost per mile
The 2001 NHTS provides an estimated gas price for each vehicle. However, these prices,
which are based on the fuel type as indicated by the household and on gasoline price data
collected by the Energy Information Administration (EIA), produce a relatively uniform
distribution, ranging from approximately $1.41 to $1.47 per gallon, with the majority of
households spending approximately $1.46 per gallon (Energy Information Administration
2003). Detailed gas prices are available from various sources, one of them being the Oil
Price Information Service (OPIS). It would be possible to get prices from different cities or
counties within Oregon on a weekly, monthly or annual basis. Unfortunately, the NHTS data
does not include a location indicator; so the study could not match gas prices to individual
household locations. Thus, the analysis assumed that Oregon households faced an average
retail price for gas of $1.46 in 2001, which included the 24 cents-per-gallon gasoline tax.
The gas price per gallon was divided by fuel efficiency, to obtain the fuel cost per mile for
each vehicle in a household. The household fuel cost per mile under the gasoline tax was
calculated by taking the mile-weighted average of gasoline cost per mile for all household
vehicles.
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The NHTS provides two fuel efficiency estimates - the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) estimate and the Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimate. Rather than
using the EPA fuel efficiency estimates, which are known to be overstated, this analysis used
the EIA fuel efficiency measures. For the state of Oregon, the average fuel efficiency was
20.75 – 21.23 miles per gallon for vehicles in urban areas, and 19.78 miles per gallon for
vehicles in rural areas. At a fuel efficiency of 20 miles per gallon a 1.2 cents-per-mile VMT
fee would be equivalent to the current 24 cents per gallon gasoline tax. Thus, on average,
rural households would pay slightly less in road user fees per mile than their urban
counterparts after a conversion to a VMT fee.
To calculate the fuel cost per mile under the VMT fee, the state gasoline tax (24 cents per
gallon for Oregon) was subtracted from the gas price; the net gas cost was then divided by the
fuel efficiency for each vehicle, the per-mile fee was added; and then a weighted average was
calculated. (See Table A.2 in Appendix A for more details.)

3.1.4 Mileage measures
Self-reported annual miles for each vehicle were used for this study. Household miles were
therefore the sum of all individual vehicle miles for all household vehicles.

3.2

SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR OREGON

The summary statistics for the most part were consistent with previous studies.
According to the Oregon data observations from the 2001 NHTS data used in this study, the
average household in Oregon owned 2.19 vehicles. Urban households owned an average of
1.99 vehicles, while rural households owned 2.72 vehicles on average.
The households were initially placed into one of 18 income groups.1 The average household
income group for the NHTS sample was 9.26, implying an average household income of
slightly above $44,999 (since the upper bound household income in Group 9 was $44,999).
Surprisingly, the average rural household income group – 9.38 – was higher than the urban
group (9.23), a finding somewhat counter to conventional wisdom. One possible explanation
for the apparent higher average income for rural households was that there tended to be more
members in the rural households (2.49), than in the urban households (2.43). The average
household size for Oregon was 2.44 members per household.
A more likely explanation for this unexpected result comes from the definition of urban and
rural households adopted by the NHTS in placing households in one of the two groups. The
NHTS uses the Census Bureau definition which classifies a place as “urban” using a complex
algorithm involving population size (2,500 or more) and population density (500 per square
mile or more); all other places are identified as “rural”. The Census definition overstates rural
areas by counting as rural many small areas that have strong ties to urban areas. The people in
those areas classified as “rural” may well have much higher incomes than those in what
would be considered rural Oregon by state policy makers (Crandall and Weber 2005).
1
Due to the relatively small number of Oregon households in the NHTS sample, there were very few
households in some of the 18 income groups. Thus for the analysis the Oregon households were organized into
six income groups so as to provide a reasonable number of households in each category.
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Crandall and Weber (2005) argue that the Census definition of urban and rural may not be
ideal, because it fails to incorporate the fact that areas around urban or metropolitan cities,
which are ‘rural’ according to the Census, still have full access to urban transportation
systems and other services that truly isolated areas may not have access to. Instead, they
propose an alternative definition that incorporates location relative to large cities and whether
or not there are linkages to those cities. Such a classification system would more accurately
model a household's access to transportation and employment opportunities. Unfortunately,
the NHTS does not provide the households’ city or county location. The NHTS does include
data on population density at the block and tract level; however, households are assigned to
one of eight categories, and this variable was therefore not viewed as an accurate measure.
The average vehicle in Oregon was driven 8,859.39 miles in 2001. The average vehicle in
urban areas was driven 8,796.01 miles, compared to 8,989.71 miles in rural areas.
The average household member in Oregon drove 15.01 miles to work in 2001. The average
household member in an urban area drove 13.75 miles, while the average household member
in a rural area drove 18.46 miles to work.
The average vehicle age for Oregon was 11.40 years. On average, vehicles in rural areas
tended to be slightly older than those in urban areas – 12.02 years in rural areas and 11.08
years in urban areas.
As expected, car choice appeared to vary by location. As seen in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, a larger
proportion in urban areas owned automobiles, vans, and smaller vehicles than in rural areas.
Those in rural areas were more likely to own trucks.
Table 3.3: Number of Vehicles by Type and Location: Urban/Rural

Urban
Rural

Car
297
113

Van
44
16

SUV
79
40

Number Of Vehicles
Truck
R.V. Motorcycle
123
12
27
112
5
10

Other
4
9

Total
586
305

Source: 2001 NHTS data for Oregon

Table 3.4: Percent of Vehicles by Type and Location: Urban/Rural

Urban
Rural

Car
0.507
0.370

Van
0.075
0.052

SUV
0.135
0.131

Number Of Vehicles
Truck
R.V.
Motorcycle
0.210 0.020
0.046
0.367 0.016
0.033

Other
0.007
0.030

Source: 2001 NHTS data for Oregon

Thus, given the vehicle mix in urban versus rural Oregon, it was not clear that the rural part
of the state would be adversely impacted overall by a change to a VMT fee. Rural drivers
appeared to be driving less fuel efficient vehicles, on average, and those are the ones that
would actually experience a decrease in per mile road taxes under a VMT fee.
On average, households in this analysis held on to their vehicles for twelve years in rural
areas and eleven years in urban areas, a few more years than other estimates (Barnes and
Langworthy 2003).
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The NHTS sample included 407 Oregon households with a total of 893 vehicles. From this
sample, the authors assigned weighted averages based on vehicle miles for fuel efficiency and
fuel cost per mile. If a household was missing fuel efficiency for one or multiple vehicles,
that vehicle was assigned the average of the household's remaining vehicles’ fuel efficiency.
If fuel price was missing, the missing value was assigned the sample average, since there was
a relatively uniform distribution of prices.
If annual miles were not reported, or were reported as missing in the sample, it was assumed
that the vehicle was not used in that year, and these vehicles were ignored. Thus, these
vehicles were also excluded in the household vehicle count. For example, if a household
reportedly owned four vehicles, but reported zero miles for one vehicle, the vehicle count was
readjusted to three. Furthermore, recreational vehicles were also ignored, and households’
vehicle counts were again adjusted accordingly. All of the other data used in this analysis
were from the NHTS data set.
After these adjustments, if a household was missing any of the variables included in the
analysis, the household was excluded. For the static model analysis this resulted in a sample
of 367 households. The additional data required for the OLS regression reduced the sample to
339 Oregon households.

3.3

AN EXPANDED DATA SET

The discrete-continuous choice (DCC) model requires substantially more data than the static
model or the regression models. This requirement resulted in a significant reduction in the
number of usable households from the Oregon sample, and such a small sample size would
have prevented the analysis from producing meaningful results. Thus, an attempt was made
to expand the data set for the DCC model by utilizing households from other comparable
states. The authors used cluster analysis to identify states that had characteristics most
similar to Oregon for the additional households in this expanded analysis.
The cluster analysis used a table with 51 observations (50 states and the District of Columbia)
and 39 variables. The available variables were narrowed down to a list of 17, with some
derived from the original 39. The cluster analysis applied a mathematical algorithm to find
the states most similar to Oregon with respect to these variables. For example, as Oregon had
a very high rural population, the cluster analysis separated states with high or low rural
populations while accounting for other variables, such as personal income, total population
and total miles driven per capita in rural or urban areas. Table 3.5 shows the variables chosen
for use in the cluster analysis
The data used in this cluster analysis were from the Federal Highway Administration’s
(FHWA) Highway Statistics, an annual summary of various highway statistics for each state
and the District of Columbia (FHWA 2002). To coincide with the 2001 NHTS data set, the
analysis used the 2001 highway statistics. Although there were several tables available for
each year, the data was drawn from the ‘Selected Measures for Peer State’ table.
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Table 3.5: List of Variables Used in Cluster Analysis
Variable Name
Urban Lane Miles Divided by Total Lane Miles
Rural VMT Divided by Rural Lane Miles
Urban VMT Divided by Urban Lane Miles
Rural Lane Mi. Divided by Total Rural Land Sq.Mi.
Urban Lane Mi. Divided by Total Urban Land Sq.Mi
Urban Land Sq.Mi. Divided by Total Land Sq.Mi.
Rural Population Divided by Rural Land Sq.Mi.
Urban Population Divided by Urban Land Sq.Mi.
Total Population Per Square Mile
Urban Population Divided by Total Population
Personal Income Per Capita
Personal Gross State Product Per Capita
Percent of Total VMT Driven by Trucks in Rural Areas
Percent of Total VMT Driven by Trucks in Urban Areas
Rural VMT Divided by Rural Population
Urban VMT Divided by Urban Population
Total VMT Per Capita

Measures
Urban road proportion
Proxy for rural congestion
Proxy for urban congestion
Rural road density
Urban road density
Urban land proportion
Rural population density
Urban population density
Total population density
Urban population proportion

Rural VMT per capita
Urban VMT per capita
Per capita VMT for state

Source: FHWA Highway Statistics 2001 (http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/hs01/index.htm)

The STATA Data Analysis and Statistical Software was used to run a hierarchical clustering
based on complete linkages. This method is appropriate when non-chaining similarities exist
and when the number of total groups is not clear. Each value first had to be transformed into
Z-scores to account for the fact that the variables are measured in different units. For
example, it would be inaccurate to compare a proportion (such as the urban proportion of
total lane miles) and personal income per capita as measured in dollars. There were several
ways to standardize the data. The authors chose to use the following method:
Xnew= (Xold-Xmean)/XStDev

(3-1)

where
Xnew was the standardized value,
Xold was the original value,
Xmean was the variable’s mean, and
XStDev was the standard deviation of the variable.
Based on this analysis the state found to be most similar to Oregon was Nebraska, followed
by Wisconsin. Other states found to be similar to Oregon included Colorado, Washington,
Michigan, Virginia, Minnesota, Texas, Utah, and Oklahoma. The complete results are shown
in Figure 3.1. Texas and Wisconsin (referred to as “add-on states”) elected to have larger
samples drawn for the 2001 NHTS and were therefore over-represented; thus they were
excluded. The 2001 NHTS survey did not provide enough observations in Nebraska or
Oklahoma, so these were also excluded from the analysis. The remaining six states that
showed similar travel patterns as Oregon are listed in Table 3.6, as well as the number of
additional observations.
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Dendrogram for CompleteLink cluster analysis
Figure 3.1: Cluster analysis results

Table 3.6: Added observations from the NHTS as a result of the cluster analysis
State
# Households In NHTS
Colorado
466
Washington
705
Michigan
992
Virginia
737
Minnesota
681
Utah
200
Total
3581
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4.0

STATIC MODEL RESULTS

In the Oregon 2001 NHTS data set, the average gasoline price paid per gallon was $1.46,
which included the 24 cents-per-gallon gasoline tax. Thus, the average price of gasoline net
of the gasoline tax was $1.22. To update the results to a more realistic gasoline price, the
authors later did the same calculations using a price of $2.64 per gallon ($2.40 per gallon net
of the 24 cents-per-gallon gasoline tax.)
Of interest was how a change from the 24 cents-per-gallon gasoline tax to a 1.2 cents per mile
VMT fee would affect the per-mile total gasoline costs for vehicles with different fuel
efficiencies. Vehicles that achieved less than 20 miles per gallon would pay less under the
VMT fee, while those that got over 20 miles per gallon would pay more.
Given that the NHTS Oregon data sample exhibited an average fuel efficiency of 20.75 miles
per gallon, if all vehicles were driven the same number of miles, one would expect a decrease
in expenditures on road use after a change to a VMT fee. The actual impact would depend on
the relative number of miles driven by vehicles of differing fuel efficiencies. The net change
in expenditures and incidence, based on location and assuming a net fuel cost of $1.22, was
calculated excluding households with missing fuel efficiency data.
West (2005) reports that incidence is less regressive if all households are included, not just
those that have vehicles. This result suggests that in West’s sample zero vehicle households
were more frequent in the lower income classes. There were 32 households in the Oregon
NHTS sample with zero vehicles. Nineteen households reported that they owned zero
vehicles, while thirteen households were assigned a value of zero for the number of vehicles,
because they either did not report annual miles for all vehicles or they reported zero miles for
all vehicles. As seen in Table 4.1, households with zero vehicles were overwhelmingly urban
households, and they also appeared to be those in the lower income groups (less than $29,999
annual household income).
Table 4.1: Characteristics of households with zero vehicles
Number of Households
with Zero Vehicles
Urban with zero vehicles
29
Rural with zero vehicles
3
Household head – Male
16
Household head – Female
16
Income Group 1 ($0~$14,999)
13
Income Group 2 ($15,000~$29,999)
10
Income Group 3 ($30,000~44,999)
4
Income Group 4 ($45,000~59,999)
2
Income Group 5 ($60,000~74,999)
2
Income Group 6 ($75,000~$200,000)
0
Missing Income Group
1

The results for urban and rural vehicle expenditures under the two fee structures (gas tax and
VMT fee), both including and excluding households with zero vehicles is shown in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Change in average annual household expenditures when switching from the gasoline tax to a
VMT fee by location
Including Households with Zero Vehicles
Average Gas Tax
Average VMT Fee
Net Change in
#HHs
Expenditures
Expenditures
Expenditure
286
$1,122.85
$1,122.31
- $ 0.53
Urban
111
$1,556.92
$1,543.68
- $13.24
Rural
Excluding Households with Zero Vehicles
Average Gas Tax
Average VMT Fee
Net Change in
#HHs
Expenditures
Expenditures
Expenditure
258
$1,188.11
$1,188.02
- $ 0.09
Urban
108
$1,456.18
$1,438.49
- $17.69
Rural

The results show that the change from the gasoline tax to a VMT fee would have the net
result of reducing average expenditures for all households. However, the average savings
from the conversion would be greater for the average rural household than for the average
urban household. This is probably attributable to the fact that on average rural households
drove vehicles with lower miles per gallon than those in urban areas. However, the average
rural household in the sample also drove more miles than the average urban household.
Obviously, the change in average household expenditures was less when including those
households that had zero vehicles, a result demonstrated in the table.
The impact on household gasoline and tax expenditures by income group, both including and
excluding zero vehicle households, is shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Change in average annual household expenditures when switching from the gasoline tax to a
VMT fee by income group
Including Households with Zero Vehicles
Average Gas Tax
Average VMT Fee
Change in
Income Group
#HHs
Expenditures
Expenditures
Expenditure
$0-$14,999
52
$ 494.18
$ 500.04
$ 5.86
$15,000~$29,999
85
$ 809.86
$ 814.44
$ 4.58
$30,000~44,999
69
$ 1,105.95
$ 1,101.81
- $ 4.14
$45,000~59,999

64

$ 1,545.26

$ 1,545.48

$ 0.22

$60,000~74,999
42
$ 1,770.33
$75,000~$200,000
67
$ 1,992.60
Excluding Households with Zero Vehicles
Average Gas Tax
Income Group
#HHs
Expenditures
$0-$14,999
39
$ 658.90
$15,000~$29,999
75
$ 917.84
$30,000~44,999
65
$ 1,174.01
$45,000~59,999
62
$ 1,595.10
$60,000~74,999
40
$ 1,858.85
$75,000~$200,000
67
$ 1,992.60

$ 1,746.20
$ 1,986.59

- $ 24.13
- $ 6.00

Average VMT Fee
Expenditures
$ 666.72
$ 923.03
$ 1,169.61
$ 1,595.33
$ 1,833.51
$ 1,986.59

Change in
Expenditure
$ 7.81
$ 5.19
- $ 4.40
$ 0.23
- $ 25.34
- $ 6.00

As explained above, including households with zero vehicles resulted in smaller average
gasoline expenditures and thus less impact on average gasoline expenditures. This is because
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households with zero vehicles would not be at all affected by a change in tax structure,
because they would not spend anything on gasoline in either case. Thus, it would appear that
the relevant changes to examine are those from the sample that does not include zero-vehicle
households.
Table 4.3 shows that, on average, those in the lowest income group would pay $7.81 more
per year in gasoline expenditures under a 1.2 cents-per-mile VMT fee, and the second lowest
income group would pay an additional $5.19 per year. The group with the highest average
benefit from the change would be the $60,000-$74,999 income group, which would see, on
average, a reduction in gasoline expenditures of about $25 per year. This is followed by
those with incomes over $75,000, which gain about $6.00 per year, and those in the $30,000$44,999 income group, which gains about $4.40.
To get a better idea of the impact of this change on the regressivity of gasoline expenditures
including the tax, the incidence for each income group was calculated (Table 4.4). As
previous researchers have found, gasoline expenditures, including the gasoline tax are
regressive, a finding that also holds true in Oregon. A VMT fee would also result in a
regressive expenditure structure. (A regressive tax is one that takes a greater percentage of
income from those in lower income groups.)
Table 4.4: Comparison of incidence of gasoline expenditures under a gasoline tax and a VMT fee:
assuming a net gas cost of $1.22
Income Group
0-14,999
$15,000~$29,999
$30,000~44,999
$45,000~59,999
$60,000~74,999
$75,000~$200,000

Expenditures as % of Income with
Gasoline Tax
All
Excluding 0-vehicle
Households
HHs
4.97%
6.63%
3.61%
4.09%
2.97%
3.17%
2.97%
3.06%
2.62%
2.75%
1.81%
1.81%

Expenditures as % of Income with
VMT Fee
All
Excluding 0-vehicle
Households
HHs
5.03%
6.71%
3.63%
4.11%
2.97%
3.16%
2.97%
3.06%
2.59%
2.72%
1.81%
1.81%

However, what is of interest here is the difference between the two tax structures, focusing on
the results that exclude zero-vehicle households (since those households are not impacted).
The lowest two income groups showed slight increases in incidence (.08 and .02 percent of
income) while the $30,000-$44,999 and $60,000-$74,999 income groups showed slight
decreases (.01 and .03 percent of income). The other income groups showed no change in
incidence.
The very small changes in incidence reflect the fact that the taxes themselves represent a very
small portion of total household expenditures – much smaller than the cost of gasoline itself.
To demonstrate how small the impact of the change in tax structure is relative to the effect of
a change in the price of gasoline between 2001 and 2006, the above analysis was re-run using
a gasoline price of $2.64 per gallon (a $2.40 gas price net of the gasoline tax). These results
are shown in Table 4.5.
What becomes immediately obvious is that the regressivity of gasoline expenditures
increased substantially from that shown in Table 4.4. While moving from the gasoline tax to
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a VMT fee produced an increase in incidence for the lowest income group of .08 percent
when the net gasoline price was $1.22 per gallon, the near doubling of gasoline prices
resulted in an increased incidence with the gasoline tax from 6.63% to 11.99% – an increase
in incidence of 5.33 percent.
Table 4.5: Comparison of incidence of gasoline expenditures under a gasoline tax and a VMT fee:
assuming a net gas cost of $2.40
Income Group
0-14,999
$15,000~$29,999
$30,000~44,999
$45,000~59,999
$60,000~74,999
$75,000~$200,000

Expenditures as % of Income with
the Gasoline Tax
All
Excluding 0-vehicle
Households
HHs
9.68%
11.99%
6.59%
7.40%
5.40%
5.73%
5.36%
5.54%
4.73%
4.98%
3.28%
3.28%

Expenditures as % of Income with
the VMT Fee
All
Excluding 0-vehicle
Households
HHs
9.74%
12.07%
6.62%
7.42%
5.38%
5.72%
5.36%
5.54%
4.70%
4.94%
3.27%
3.27%

From this analysis it becomes clear that while a change from the gasoline tax of 24 cents per
gallon to a VMT fee of 1.2 cents per mile could have a slight impact on incidence, is it
miniscule compared to the impact that is felt due to the general rise in gasoline prices.

4.1

ALTERNATIVE POLICIES

As mentioned earlier, a change to a VMT fee has raised concerns, because the change in tax
structure would effectively lower the cost of driving for “gas guzzlers” and increase the total
amount paid by those driving more fuel efficient cars (although the changes are likely to be
very small compared to the overall cost of gasoline). Thus, such a change is seen as being in
conflict with alternate goals of increasing the use of hybrid vehicles and reducing the
dependence on fossil fuels.
A VMT fee could be formulated in a way that minimizes or reverses this unintentional impact
of the policy change. Sample Scenario #1 would be a VMT fee structure that maintains the
gasoline tax for those vehicles with fuel efficiency of less than 20 miles per gallon and
charges a flat 1.2 cents-per-mile VMT fee to those vehicles with fuel efficiency over 20 miles
per gallon. This policy would keep “gas guzzlers” from realizing a lower cost of driving
(which could encourage them to drive even more). Note that since a VMT fee of 1.2 cents
per mile would be a revenue-neutral change in fee structure, Sample Scenario #1 would
actually result in an increase in revenues collected by the state.
The distributional impact of Sample Scenario #1 is shown in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. Note that
households in every income group would pay more in user fees under this scenario. The
increase in the user fee for those in the lowest income group would be about twice what it
would be under a flat VMT fee of 1.2 cents per mile levied on all vehicles. However, those
in the highest income groups would not gain (in terms of paying less in user fees) as they
would under a flat VMT fee policy. Indeed, those in the two highest income groups would
end up paying between $22 and $31 more per household instead of paying less under the flat
VMT fee scenario.
38

Table 4.6: Household annual expenditures on gasoline under Sample Scenario #1*
Average
Average
Average
Change in
Average
Change in
user fee paid Expenditures
Expenditures
Average
Income
user fee paid
Sample
under VMT
Under VMT
Expenditures
Group
under Sample
Scenario #1
Fee of
Fee of
Under Gas
Scenario #1
($)
$.012/mile
$.012/mile ($)
Tax ($)
1
$ 658.90
$ 666.72
$ 7.82
$ 675.36
$ 16.46
2
$ 917.84
$ 923.03
$ 5.19
$ 935.01
$ 17.17
3
$ 1,174.01
$ 1,169.61
-$ 4.40
$ 1,191.91
$ 17.90
4
$ 1,595.10
$ 1,595.33
$ 0.23
$ 1,623.57
$ 28.47
5
$ 1,858.85
$ 1,833.51
-$ 25.34
$ 1,881.25
$ 22.40
6
$ 1,992.60
$ 1,986.60
-$ 6.00
$ 2,023.68
$ 31.08
*Gasoline tax of $.24 for vehicle with mpg<20; VMT fee of $.012 for vehicles with mpg >20

As shown in Table 4.7, under Sample Scenario #1 both urban and rural household would pay
more, although the increase for urban households would be slightly larger. By comparison, a
flat VMT fee would result in a reduction in fees paid by rural households and a very small
increase for urban households under the simple VMT fee.
Table 4.7: Urban/rural household annual expenditure changes under Sample Scenario #1*

Rural

Average
Expenditures
Under Gas Tax
($)
$ 1,600.17

Average
Expenditures
Under flat VMT
Fee
($)
$ 1,586.56

Urban

$ 1,249.55

$ 1,251.58

Location

Average
Change in
user fee paid
under flat
VMT fee
-$ 13.61
$

2.03

Average
Mixed Policy
Expenditures
($)
$ 1,621.93

Average
Change in
user fee paid
under
Sample
Scenario #1
$ 21.76

$ 1,272.24

$ 22.69

*Gasoline Tax of $.24 for vehicle with mpg<20; VMT of $.012 for vehicles with mpg >20

It is also possible that Sample Scenario #1 might not provide enough of an incentive for
people to purchase more fuel efficient vehicles. Thus it is also useful to consider a “step” fee
policy whereby vehicles would incur increasingly higher VMT fees, the lower the fuel
efficiency of the vehicle. In Sample Scenario #2 vehicles that achieve less than the median
fuel efficiency (approximately 18 mpg) would pay 2 cents per mile; those between the
median efficiency and 20 mpg would pay 1.5 cents per mile; and those with a fuel efficiency
of above 20 mpg would pay only 1 cent per mile in VMT fees. The incidence of this scenario
on income groups and urban/rural groups is shown in Tables 4.8 and 4.9.
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Table 4.8: Annual household expenditures by income group on gasoline under Sample Scenario #2*
Average revenue change
Average revenue
Average revenue
from gas tax to “step”
with “step” VMT
with 24 cents per
Income
VMT fee
fee
gallon gas tax
group
# hhs
1
39
$ 108.31
$ 123.60
$ 15.29
2
75
$ 150.88
$ 176.66
$ 25.78
3
65
$ 192.99
$ 223.88
$ 30.89
4
62
$ 262.21
$ 305.32
$ 43.11
5
40
$ 305.56
$ 380.27
$ 74.71
6
67
$ 327.55
$ 404.11
$ 76.56
*Step fee: a) MPG< median MPG pays 2 cents cents/mile; b) between median MPG to 20 pays 1.5 cents/mile; c) MPG>20 pays 1 cent/mile

Sample Scenario #2 would results in all income groups paying more, but the increase in fees
paid is progressively higher for higher income groups and lower for those in lower income
groups.
Table 4.9: Urban/rural annual household expenditures on gasoline under Sample Scenario #2*
Average revenue change
Average revenue
Average revenue
from gas tax to “step”
with “step”
with 24 cents per
Location
VMT fee
VMT fee
gallon gas tax
# hhs
Rural
108
$ 263.04
$ 317.40
$ 54.36
Urban

256

$ 205.41

$ 238.46

$ 33.05

*Step fee: a) MPG< median MPG pays 2 cents cents/mile; b) between median MPG to 20 pays 1.5 cents/mile; c) MPG>20 pays 1 cent/mile

Sample Scenario #2 would increase the taxes paid by both rural and urban areas, but in this
case it the rural areas would end up paying more. This is due to the combined effects of rural
areas having vehicles with lower average fuel efficiency and rural households driving more
miles.
Thus, both sample scenarios would have the effect of increasing fees paid by all groups.
Sample Scenario #1 would result in both urban and rural areas paying more. However,
Sample Scenario #1 has urban areas paying more than rural areas whereas rural areas would
pay almost twice that paid by urban areas under Sample Scenario #2.

4.2

AN ALTERNATIVE WAY TO MEASURE REGRESSIVITY: THE
SUITS INDEX

The Suits Index (Suits 1977) is a way to measure the overall regressivity of a tax, or to
compare the changes in regressivity as a result of a structural or policy change. In this study
one can compare the regressivity of the gasoline tax to a VMT fee. The Suits Index, bounded
between -1 and +1, is convenient in that it provides one number that can be compared across
tax regimes. A value of -1 would indicate that the lowest income group bears the entire
burden of the tax; a value of +1 would indicate that the highest income group bears the entire
tax burden. A value of 0 would indicate that the proportion of the overall tax paid by each
income group is exactly equal to the proportion of the population represented by that income
group. (For a more detailed explanation of the Suits index, see Appendix B.)
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Under the gasoline tax the Suits Index is -0.176, while the Index is -0.225 under a flat 1.2
cents per mile VMT fee, implying the VMT fee would shift some of the tax burden from the
higher income groups to the lower income groups, making it more regressive. The Suits
Index for Sample Scenario #1 is -.185, indicating a greater degree of regressivity than the
gasoline tax but less than that of a flat VMT fee. The Suits Index for Sample Scenario #2 is
-.162, indicating that although everyone would pay more under Sample Scenario #2, this
policy would result in a less regressive tax structure than the other alternatives, including the
current gas tax.
As mentioned earlier, the analysis discussed in this chapter assumes that a change to a VMT
fee (which would result in a change in the per-mile cost of driving for some households)
would not have an impact on demand (the number of miles driven). If those household
groups in which the per-mile cost of gas increased were to respond by decreasing their
driving, the increase in incidence for those groups would be less. Of course, it is also
possible that those households experiencing a decrease in per-mile driving cost would drive
more and thus may benefit from the change in tax. What actually occurs would depend on
the demand response to the change in per-mile costs.
Accordingly, the next stage of this research focused on developing an estimate of the demand
response to the per-mile driving cost changes that would be caused by the change in tax and
then recalculating the incidence to include the impact of the demand response
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5.0 REGRESSION MODEL RESULTS
With the regression model, also known as the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model, one
addresses the relationship between household miles and vehicle type by including a
substitution dummy variable equal to one if the household has more than one type of vehicle
and zero otherwise. The inclusion of this variable allows one to calculate different elasticities
for households with multiple vehicle types and those without. Households with multiple
vehicle types are expected to be less responsive to fuel cost per mile changes, since they are
able to substitute away from vehicles with a higher fuel cost per mile.
The OLS model for this analysis is based on the following equation:

M = f (PM ,I,PM * I,U,C,SUB,PM * SUB,HH M )

(5-1)

where
M is the total annual miles driven by the household;
PM is the fuel cost per mile under the gasoline tax;
I is annual household income;
U is a dummy variable equal to one if the household is located in an urban area, and zero
otherwise;
C is the number of vehicles the household owns;
SUB is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the household has more than one type
of vehicle such as a car and truck and zero otherwise;
PM *I is an interaction term between the fuel cost per mile and income;
PM *SUB is an interaction term between the fuel cost per mile and the substitution dummy
variable; and

HHM is a vector of household characteristics that includes the number of children (CHILD),
number of workers (WORK) and a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the
household respondent is male and zero otherwise (MALE).
For details and definitions for each of the variables, see Appendix C, Section C.1.
As the fuel cost per mile increases, one would expect households to reduce miles driven; so
the coefficient on the average fuel cost per mile should be negative. Assuming miles driven
is a normal good, one expects the sign on income to be positive, suggesting that as household
income increases, the household is able to spend more of its income on miles. One expects
the coefficient on the location variable to be negative, which would imply that households in
urban areas drive less than those in rural areas due to shorter commutes to work and more
developed surroundings.
If households have more than one vehicle, they are more likely to drive more miles.
Households with multiple types of vehicles are able to substitute between vehicles in
response to other variables, such as the fuel cost per mile. This flexibility may encourage
them to drive more, relative to other households that are not able to substitute between
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vehicles. West (2002) states that, “Male-headed households are even more likely to own two
vehicles than they are to own one.”2
As the number of children or the number of workers increase, one would expect households
to drive more, out of necessity. Households may have to take their children to more
activities, increasing miles traveled (West 2002). West finds that male-headed households
drive more miles than those headed by females.
The interaction term between the fuel cost per mile and income allows for different impacts
on different income groups. As the fuel cost per mile increases, one would expect
households with higher incomes to drive more miles than those with lower incomes, because
those in the higher income groups will not feel as great a burden on their total income with
the increasing fuel cost per mile. That is, those in higher income groups are expected to have
a more inelastic demand, as demonstrated by West (2002). Similarly, the interaction term
between the fuel cost per mile and the substitution dummy variable allows for different
impacts on those with multiple vehicle types and those without. Presumably, households
with multiple vehicle types are able to substitute between their vehicles, and the coefficient
should therefore be positive. Thus, relative to households who cannot substitute between
vehicle types as the fuel cost per mile increases, households with multiple vehicle types are
more likely to drive more miles.
The OLS regression was run on household annual miles with the fuel cost per mile under the
current gasoline tax.3 A change in policy to a 1.2 cents-per-mile VMT fee was captured by
subtracting the $0.24 tax out of the gasoline price, dividing the remaining net gas cost by the
fuel efficiency and then adding a $0.012 VMT fee.4 The new fuel cost per mile – under the
VMT fee – was thus different for every household, unless the household had an average fuel
efficiency equal to 20 MPG.5 The incidence calculations below compare the fitted values
from the OLS regression and the recalculated fitted values under the new fuel cost per mile
variable, based on the estimated parameters.

5.1

OREGON SAMPLE REGRESSION RESULTS

The authors estimated a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of annual
household miles using the sample of 339 Oregon households from the 2001 National
Household Travel Survey (NHTS). The results are shown in Table 5.1. All signs were as
expected, based on economic theory and the findings of previous studies. All coefficient
estimates have the expected signs, and the adjusted R2 for the model is 0.46.

2

Our data support West's statement. The correlation coefficient between our male dummy variable and
vehicle count variable was approximately 0.16. Though not particularly high, there was a positive correlation
between the two variables.
3
See A2 in the Appendix for the calculation of fuel cost per mile.
4
Empirical studies show that nearly the entire state gasoline tax burden is placed on the consumer,
which justifies subtracting the entire $0.24 tax from the gasoline price (Chernick and Reschovsky, 1997 and
Chouinard and Perloff, 2003).
5
ODOT based the $0.012 per mile fee on the concept of a revenue neutral VMT fee, using an average
fuel efficiency of 20 mpg for all non-commercial vehicles in Oregon. Thus the average household should be
unaffected by the policy change. This study uses the change in fuel expenditures by households as a measure of
well-being.
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Table 5.1: Dependent variable – annual household miles (logarithmic)†
Variable Name
Constant

PM

I
PM * I

Coefficient
-17.72*
-8.76*
2.21*
0.72*

Standard Error
6.239724
2.388977
0.613436
0.2352192

0.44

0.4005742

1.09

-0.16*
0.54*
1.39
0.17*
0.21*
0.04

0.0950097
0.1290508
1.050415
0.0874272
0.0528672
0.0393044

-1.67
4.18
1.32
1.94
3.95
0.91

PM * SUB
U
C
SUB
MALE
WORK
CHILD
†
*

T-statistic
-2.84
-3.67
3.60
3.05

Italicized variables are logarithmic
All interpretations are based on a .10 significance level

Income and vehicles owned by a household were found to have a positive and significant
effect on miles driven. The dummy variable for urban households was significant and
suggests that urban households drive fewer miles than rural households. Households with
male respondents drive more miles than households with female respondents. Household
annual miles increase as the number of workers increases, as expected. As the fuel cost per
mile increases, households reduce the overall number of miles driven; however, the overall
reduction depends on household income and whether or not the household is able to
substitute between vehicle types. The fuel cost per mile and the interaction term between the
fuel cost per mile and income were statistically significant. However, the interaction term
between the fuel cost per mile and the substitution variable was not found to be significant.
As the number of children increases, one would expect the household to drive more miles as
suggested by the model; however, this was not statistically significant. Though the
substitution variable was not statistically significant, it had the expected sign, as discussed in
Chapter 4. That is, if a household is able to substitute between vehicles, one would expect
them to drive more miles relative to a household (all else equal) that is unable to substitute
between vehicles.
One can interpret the coefficients of the logarithmic terms as elasticities. The model assumes
that the elasticity of annual household miles driven with respect to fuel cost per mile varies
across income groups. As expected, higher income groups, on average, are less responsive to
changes in the fuel cost per mile, as shown in Table 5.2. The coefficient of the interaction
term between the fuel cost per mile and the substitution dummy variable also allows for the
elasticity to vary between households that are able to substitute between vehicle types, and
those that cannot. Though not statistically significant, this coefficient was as expected and
indicates that households that are not able to substitute between vehicle types have a more
elastic demand, as expected.6 These households are more sensitive to changes in the fuel cost
per mile. It should be noted that the elasticities will vary by households; however, this
analysis used the average income value for each group to provide an approximation.

6

The elasticity of miles driven with respect to the fuel cost per mile can be calculated as:

εM ,P = −8.6814 + 0.71* I + 0.4548 * SUB .
M
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Table 5.2: Elasticity by income group – based on average income
Elasticity with
Elasticity
Income Group
Average Income
SUB
without SUB
1
$9,055.90
1.79
2.23
2
$21,983.11
1.16
1.59
3
$36,899.07
0.78
1.22
4
$51,952.61
0.54
0.98
5
$67,394.80
0.35
0.79
6
$106,043.36
0.03
0.47

The next step was to estimate the welfare impacts and changes in consumer surplus that
would occur with a change from the current 24 cents-per-gallon gasoline tax to a 1.2 centsper-mile VMT fee. The authors assumed a linear demand function.
Generally, welfare is defined as the total consumer and producer surplus gained (or lost) as a
result of – in this case – the policy change. To society as a whole, it does not matter whether
consumers or producers gain more. Thus, a positive welfare gain may reflect an overall gain
for consumers or producers. In this case the producer is the government agency that collects
the tax, so the change in surplus going to the producer is the change in revenues collected by
the agency. (See Appendix D for welfare, consumer, and producer surplus equations.)
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the average changes in consumer surplus, tax revenue and welfare
by income group and by urban versus rural households. As expected, the changes in tax
revenue collected by the state agency as a result of a change from the gas to a VMT fee were
smaller in this analysis than they were in the static model, which did not account for changes
in miles driven in response to the change in the cost of driving. However, the change in tax
revenue paid by a consumer only tells part of the story. If consumers end up driving more
than they did before the change in fees, the consumers derive a benefit from the additional
travel that is reflected in the measures of consumer surplus.
Table 5.3: Average changes in consumer surplus, tax revenue and welfare by income ($/household)
Average Change in
Average Change in
Average Change in
Income Group
Consumer Surplus
Taxes paid
Welfare
1
- $ 7.51
$ 5.03
- $ 2.48
2
- $ 6.47
$ 6.13
- $ 0.34
3
$ 9.36
- $ 4.24
$ 5.12
4
- $ 2.41
$ 8.06
$ 5.57
5
$ 28.48
- $ 12.92
$ 15.56
6
$ 12.77
- $ 2.60
$ 10.17

The overall impact on social welfare is the sum of the change in consumer surplus and the
change in producer surplus. So for instance, in the case of Income Group 1, there would be
an average loss in consumer surplus of $7.51 that represents both the additional amount paid
in taxes and the value of the reduced travel that would be caused by the increase in the cost of
driving. Part of this would be transferred to the government agency in the form of increased
revenue of $5.03. The net impact on social welfare would be a loss equal to $7.51 - $5.03 =
$2.48 (-$2.48 in Table 5.3). Note that these represent very small changes; even for a
household in the lowest income group this represents a change in expenditures that is less
than 1/10 of one percent of income.
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Overall those in the highest income groups would have a net gain: they would pay less to
drive and this would stimulate additional travel that benefits them. However, given the
extremely small difference relative to their income (again less than 1/10 of one percent), this
is not likely to alter behavior significantly.
Thus, in the case of a demand curve with some elasticity, the change in consumer surplus
places a dollar value on the welfare impact on consumers in each group – including both the
change in taxes paid and the value the consumer places on the induced change in miles
driven. Note that the general pattern of the consumer surplus change in this model is very
similar to the change in taxes paid in the static model, and in both cases the impact on
households is extremely small relative to their household income or their total annual
expenditures on driving. This suggests that policymakers who just need a “ballpark” estimate
of the impact of a change in highway user fees could use the results provided by the static
model, which requires less data analysis than calculations based on the OLS regression
model. However, it also should be noted that this may only be true for small changes similar
to the magnitudes considered in this study.
Table 5.4: Average changes in consumer surplus, tax revenue and welfare by location ($/household)
Average Change in
Average Change in
Average Change in
Location Group
Consumer Surplus
Tax Revenue
Welfare
Rural
$ 17.40
- $ 9.46
$ 7.93
Urban
- $ 0.62
$ 4.89
$ 4.27

The OLS results for the Urban/Rural impacts were again similar to the static result: urban
households would pay slightly more under a VMT fee and rural households would pay less.
However, the large change in consumer surplus for rural households reflects their benefits
from increased travel that would be induced by the lower cost of driving under a VMT fee.
Once again, the study examined the impact of sample VMT fee scenarios that could be
considered to try and encourage use of more efficient vehicles and reduce driving. Table 5.5
shows the difference between the gasoline tax incidence and the incidence under VMT fee
Sample Scenario #1. Again, in this case households in every income group would pay more
per year; however, there was not a clear impact on overall social welfare. There were
consumer surplus losses for all income groups.
Table 5.5: Annual household expenditures on gasoline under Sample Scenario #1*
Average Change in
Average Change in
Average Change in
Income Group
Consumer Surplus
Taxes paid
Welfare
1
- $ 11.80
$ 13.52
$ 1.72
2
- $ 16.23
$ 16.25
$ 0.01
3
- $ 11.81
$ 9.07
- $ 2.74
4
- $ 27.51
$ 33.33
$ 5.82
5
- $ 19.12
$ 17.93
- $ 1.19
6
- $ 25.02
$ 22.82
- $ 2.20
* Gasoline Tax of $.24 for vehicle with mpg<20; VMT of $.012 for vehicles with mpg >20

As shown in Table 5.6, for rural households, Sample Scenario #1 would mean an increase in
taxes paid and a loss of consumer surplus that reflects less driving. In this case, urban
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households would pay more per year, but the increase in fees paid would be larger for rural
households.
Table 5.6: Urban/rural annual household expenditure changes under Sample Scenario #1*
Average Change in
Average Change in
Average Change in
Location Group
Consumer Surplus
Tax Revenue
Welfare
Rural
- $ 17.81
$ 19.68
$ 1.88
Urban
- $ 19.46
$ 18.90
- $ 0.55
*Gasoline Tax of $.24 for vehicle with mpg<20; VMT of $.012 for vehicles with mpg >20

For Sample Scenario #2, results for the distributional impact are presented in Table 5.7. Here
the losses in consumer surplus for the highest income group would be almost six times as
large as those for the lowest income group, although again all groups would end up losing
both in terms of consumer surplus and in terms of additional taxes paid per year.
Table 5.7: Annual household expenditures on gasoline under Sample Scenario #2*
Income
Average change in
Average change
Average change
group
# hhs
consumer surplus
in tax revenue
in welfare
1
39
- $ 8.68
$ 11.11
$ 2.43
2

74

- $ 17.77

$ 20.42

$ 2.65

3
4

61
60

- $ 29.69
- $ 33.92

$ 30.74
$ 36.23

$ 1.06
$ 2.31

5

39

- $ 63.32

$ 80.30

$ 16.97

6

66

- $ 62.34

$ 86.99

$ 24.64

*Step fee: a) MPG< median MPG pays 2 cents cents/mile; b) between median MPG to 20 pays 1.5 cents/mile;
c) MPG>20 pays 1 cent/mile

Finally, Table 5.8 shows the impacts on the rural/urban households resulting from Sample
Scenario #2. This alternative would impose even larger negative impacts on both urban and
rural households than Sample Scenario #1, and rural households would pay an average of
over $58 more per year than under the current gasoline tax.
Table 5.8: Urban/rural annual household expenditures on gasoline under Sample Scenario 2*
Average change in Average change
Location
# hhs
consumer surplus
in tax revenue
Average change in welfare
Rural
101
- $ 37.45
$ 58.81
$ 21.36
Urban
238
- $ 34.88
$ 37.51
$ 2.62
*Step fee: a) MPG< median MPG pays 2 cents cents/mile; b) between median MPG to 20 pays 1.5 cents/mile; c) MPG>20 pays 1 cent/mile

Thus, while Sample Scenarios #1 and #2 were designed to prevent a VMT fee policy from
discouraging adoption and use of more fuel efficient vehicles, they would result in placing
rural households at a greater disadvantage relative to urban households, compared to a flat 1.2
cents-per-mile VMT fee. Both sample scenarios would not have a revenue-neutral impact, as
all households would pay more in fees, although in general the sample scenarios would
impose larger costs on higher income households than lower income households.
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5.1.1 The Suits Index
As in the static model, the Suits Index was also calculated for the OLS model. Under the
gasoline tax, the Suits Index was approximately -0.133 compared to a Suits Index
approximately equal to -0.142 under a flat 1.2 cents-per-mile VMT fee, implying that the
VMT fee would shift some of the tax burden from the higher income groups to the lower
income groups, making it slightly more regressive. The Suits index for Sample Scenario #1
was -.145, indicating a greater degree of regressivity than either the gasoline tax or a flat
VMT fee. The Suits Index for Sample Scenario #2 was -.111, indicating that, although
everyone would pay more under Sample Scenario #2, this policy would result in a less
regressive tax structure than the other alternatives.

5.2

SENSITIVITY TESTS ON THE REGRESSION MODEL

Sensitivity tests were conducted to further validate the regression model. These tests showed
how the model output variable (i.e., the dependent variable) varied as the input variables
changed within a certain range. The output variable in the regression model was the total
household vehicle miles driven in a year. The input variables included fuel cost per mile,
income, urban/rural dummy, vehicle count, gender of household head, number of workers in
household, and number of children in household. For instance, in anticipation of higher fuel
prices in the future, one could conduct a model sensitivity test in which the fuel cost per mile
of driving is artificially increased. The model-predicted reduction in household vehicle miles
driven can then be observed and evaluated for reasonableness and validity.
In each of the three sets of the sensitivity tests, the authors varied the values of fuel price,
vehicle fuel efficiency (MPG), and fuel tax respectively, while keeping the other variables
intact. The initial values of the input variables in the model were set as follows based on the
average values of the whole sample:
Fuel price = $1.22/gallon
Federal tax = $0.18/gallon
state tax = $0.24/gallon
MPG = 21
Income = $51,000
No. of workers = 1
No. of children = 1
No. of vehicles = 2
Results of the sensitivity tests are documented below.

5.2.1 Changing fuel price
To determine the impact of fuel price change, fuel price was varied from $1 to $10 per gallon
in increments of 25 cents. The lowest income group was the most sensitive to changes in fuel
prices. The lowest line on the first graph in Figure 5.1 shows that when fuel price was
increased from $1 to $10 per gallon, the households with $10,000 household annual income
significantly reduced their household vehicle miles driven from 9,000 miles to about 6,000
miles. The sensitivity decreased with increases in household income, suggesting that the
higher the income group, the lower the impact of a change in fuel price. Households with one
vehicle were the most sensitive to a fuel price change, whereas there was no marked
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difference in sensitivity between households with two or more vehicles. Location, gender of
household head, number of children in household, and number of workers in household were
sensitive to fuel price increases at the beginning, but the sensitivity gradually declined as fuel
price was increased.

5.2.2 Changing vehicle fuel efficiency (MPG)
To determine the impact of change in MPG, it was varied from 5 to 50 mpg in increments of
5 mpg. As shown in Figure 5.2, the lowest income group was the most sensitive to changes in
MPG. The sensitivity decreased with increases in household income. Households with one
vehicle were the most sensitive to an MPG change, whereas there was no marked difference
in sensitivity between households with two or more vehicles. Location, gender of household
head, number of children in household, and number of workers in household were sensitive to
changes in MPG at the beginning, but the sensitivity gradually declined as MPG was
increased.

5.2.3 Changing fuel tax
To determine the impact of fuel tax changes, the state fuel tax was varied from $0 to $1 in
increments of 5 cents. As shown in Figure 5.3, the lowest income group was the most
sensitive to changes in fuel tax. The sensitivity decreased with increases in household
income, and higher income groups were not as sensitive to changes in the fuel tax.
Households with one vehicle were the most sensitive to a fuel tax change, whereas
households with two or more vehicles were relatively insensitive to fuel tax changes. Also
location, gender of the household head, the number of children, and number of workers in a
household were not very sensitive to fuel tax changes.
Overall, the results of the sensitivity analysis suggested that the OLS model results were
consistent with expectations and demonstrated the robustness of the model over reasonable
ranges of key variables.
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Figure 5.1: Sensitivity test results – changing fuel price
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Figure 5.2: Sensitivity test results – changing household vehicle fuel efficiency (MPG)

52

Figure 5.3: Sensitivity test results – changing fuel tax
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5.3

EXPANDED SAMPLE REGRESSION RESULTS

For comparison, the authors also conducted the OLS regression using the expanded, sevenstate data set obtained from the cluster analysis. The OLS results are presented in Table 5.9.
Table 5.9: OLS Results Using the Expanded Seven State Sample (n=3015)
Variable name
Constant
PM
I
PM * I
PM * SUB
U
C
SUB
MALE
WORK

Coefficient (7 state OLS)
-9.43126
-5.618888
1.512523
0.4509653
0.5578698
-0.1091431
0.7225826
1.636189
0.1323724
0.1739668

Standard Error
2.143266
0.8021254
0.2035075
0.0761085
0.0980905
0.0333623
0.04566409
0.2657104
0.0289016
0.0171458

t-statistic
-4.40
-7.00
7.43
5.93
5.69
-3.27
15.83
6.16
4.58
10.15

With an R2=0.44, the explanatory power of the OLS model run using this expanded data set
was not significantly different from that of the OLS model using the Oregon-only data set
(R2=0.46). Since a larger data sample should yield a higher R2 than a smaller sample if the
samples are drawn from the same population, the fact that the R2 for the expanded sample
OLS model did not increase suggests that there may still have been significant differences
between Oregon and other states that were not taken into account. Since the purpose of this
study was to examine the impact of the policy change on Oregon households, the authors
decided to base the study results on the Oregon-only OLS regression coefficients rather than
those obtained using the expanded data sample. The expanded data set was nevertheless
expected to be useful for future estimation of the discrete-continuous choice model, which is
more data intensive than the OLS model.

5.4

SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION MODEL

The preliminary results in the estimation of the simultaneous equation model (SEM) were
unsatisfactory. Thus, given time limitations, the research team (in consultation with the
technical advisory committee), decided to drop the simultaneous equation model from further
consideration and focus on the OLS model and the discrete-continuous choice model.
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6.0 DISCRETE-CONTINUOUS CHOICE MODEL
As mentioned earlier, the discrete-continuous choice model is conceptually superior to the
other models used in this study. However, given the complexity of the model and the data
requirements, the investigators did not have time to completely develop this model and use it
to provide a full distributional analysis. This chapter provides the preliminary results
obtained in refining the model and using it to measure distributional impacts. Some
possibilities for future research are also suggested.

6.1

METHODOLOGY

The model adopted here is similar to the one proposed by Kenneth Train (Train 1986). It is
based on the assumption that households will simultaneously choose the number of vehicles
to own, the type of vehicle and the annual miles driven in each vehicle.
The discrete-continuous model consists of a discrete model for the vehicle number choice and
the vehicle type and a continuous model for the vehicle miles driven. A household first
chooses the number of vehicles to own as shown in Figure 6.1. Based on the number of
vehicles, it then chooses the types of vehicles to own. A household owning a single vehicle
can own either a car or truck. Households owning two vehicles can choose to own either cars
or trucks, or a car and a truck. Similarly, households with three vehicles can choose between
all cars, all trucks, two cars and a truck, or two trucks and a car. As the vehicles a household
chooses to own increases, the options available for the types or combinations of vehicles to
own also increases. For simplicity purposes, households owning more than three vehicles
were not considered in this analysis.
The vehicle usage, i.e., vehicle miles driven, by each household is dependent on the types of
vehicles it owns. This model can be run at both the household level and the vehicle level; i.e.,
the total annual miles for each household can be taken as the dependent variable, or the
vehicle miles driven for each vehicle can be considered. Since the vehicle-miles-driven
model at the vehicle level could not be run (due to insufficient data), only the results of the
vehicle-miles-driven model at the household level are presented.
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Figure 6.1: Diagrammatic representation of the discrete-continuous choice model

6.1.1 Vehicle number choice model
In this model a household could choose not to own any vehicle or one, two, or three vehicles.
Households owning more than three vehicles were ignored. The vehicle choice model can be
represented by Equation 6-1:
N= f (I, U, HH)
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(6-1)

where the number of vehicles a household chooses to own (N) is dependent on a number of
factors, such as income (I), household location (U), and other household characteristics (HH).

6.1.2 Vehicle type choice model
The vehicle type model can be represented by Equation 6-2:
T= f (Pv, Pm, I, U, HH)

(6-2)

where the type of vehicle a household chooses to own (T) is dependent on a number of
factors, including fuel cost per mile (Pm), the price of the vehicle (Pv), income (I), household
location (U) , and various other household characteristics (HH).

6.1.3 VMT model at the household level
The VMT model can be represented by Equation 6-3:
VMT= f (Pm, I, U, HH)

(6-3)

where the total annual miles a household drives (VMT) is dependent on a number of factors
such as fuel cost per mile (Pm), income (I), household location (U), and various other
household characteristics (HH).
The description of the variables used in the DCC model is presented in Appendix C, Section
C.2.

6.1.4 Alternative model specifications
Different specifications can be used to run the models described above. Interactions between
various variables can be tried, to capture the effects they have on the dependent variables.
6.1.4.1

Interaction between policy variables

For the vehicle type model, the fuel cost per mile and vehicle price were considered as
a percentage of income, since it provided a better understanding on the vehicle type
choice decisions made by the individual rather than the fuel cost per mile or vehicle
price alone. Similarly, an interaction between the two variables was also considered
(Pv*Pm).
T= f (Pv/I, Pm/I, Pv*Pm, U, HH)

(6-4)

where the type of vehicle a household chooses to own (T) is dependent on fuel cost
per mile as a percentage of income (Pm/I), the price of the vehicle as a percentage of
income (Pv/I), the interaction of the two (Pv*Pm), household location (U) , and
various other household characteristics (HH).
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6.1.4.2

Interactions between the policy variables and cost variability by state

Vehicle prices and gas prices are not constant for all states. Thus another model
specification for the vehicle type choice model included the interaction between
dummy variables for various states and fuel cost per mile (States*Pm) or vehicle price
(States*Pv). This interaction was added to capture the effect to some extent.
T= f (Pv, States*Pm, U, HH)

(6-5)

T= f (Pm, States*Pv, U, HH)

(6-6)

Similarly, for the vehicle use model the interaction between fuel cost per mile and
income was considered (Pm*I).
VMT=f (Pm,Pm*I,I,U,HH)

(6-7)

where the vehicle miles traveled on a vehicle (VMT) is dependent on the fuel cost per
mile (Pm), Income (I), Household location (U) and various other household
characteristics (HH).
Different specifications were tried for the models described and only the best model
for each category is presented in this report.

6.2

DATA

The data for this model were obtained from the 2001 National Household Travel Survey
(NHTS). The vehicle type model especially requires a large data set, and Oregon had only a
limited number of households. To overcome this problem, cluster analysis was used to come
up with six other states similar to Oregon, which included Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota,
Utah, Virginia and Washington. The discrete-continuous choice model was thus run using the
data from these seven states.
The descriptive statistics for the vehicle number choice model, the vehicle type choice model,
and the vehicle use model are provided in Tables 6.1 through 6.3.

6.2.1 Vehicle number choice model
The number of vehicles a household owns was included in the household file and the vehicle
file of the 2001 NHTS data set. The data set was arranged for households owning no vehicles,
one vehicle, two or three vehicles. The model was estimated with reference to the households
owning no vehicles. The descriptive statistics for this model are presented in Table 6.1.
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Total

Washington

Virginia

Utah

Minnesota

Michigan

Colorado

Oregon

Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for vehicle number choice

Total observations

407

466

994

681

200

737

705

4190

HHs with 0 vehicles

19

17

41

23

6

31

32

169

HHs with 1 vehicle

100

122

243

178

39

176

173

1031

HHs with 2 vehicles

163

183

414

272

88

296

291

1707

HHs with 3 vehicles

76

90

174

127

35

155

126

783

HHs with more than
‘3’ vehicles

49

54

122

81

32

79

83

500

Final observations*

3353

0-vehicle HHs

18

10

34

19

6

26

24

137

1-vehicle HHs

90

113

212

162

39

160

160

936

2-vehicle HHs

154

168

371

247

78

274

264

1556

3-vehicle HHs

68

85

157

119

34

144

117

724

*The number of final observations is less than the total observations because the household income, location, and education of the
household head were not reported for some households.

6.2.2 Data for the vehicle type choice model
As described earlier, vehicle type choice is a function of vehicle price, fuel cost per mile and
other characteristics. The 2001 NHTS data set included the make and model code of each
vehicle a household owned. The value of the vehicle in the year 2001 was considered
regardless of the year it was manufactured. The vehicle prices were obtained from the 2001
Ward’s automotive year book for all the available 2001 light vehicles in the U.S market
according to the make and model (Wards Communications 2001). However, the 2001 Ward’s
automotive year book does not specify the prices of vehicles of outdated makes and models
(e.g., Hyundai Excel which was manufactured during 1984-1994). Therefore, the households
with these unavailable vehicle prices were dropped from the data set.
In order for the household choice between a car and truck to be captured, all vehicles were
categorized in to these two vehicle groups. Different categorizations were tested based on the
miles per gallon a vehicle achieves, vehicle dimensions, and vehicle weight. This information
was obtained from the following sources:
•

NHTS Classification
The 2001 NHTS data set included the variable ‘Vehicle type’ which divided the
vehicle into eight categories: car, van, SUV, pickup truck, other truck, recreational
vehicles, motorcycles and other. For the vehicle type choice model cars, vans and
SUVs were grouped into the ‘Car’ category, and pickup trucks and other trucks were
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placed into the ‘Truck’ category. RV’s and motorcycles were ignored, as the vehicle
price data for RV’s was not available.
This classification seemed reliable, as it was directly obtained from the NHTS data
set. This approach also made the work of arranging the data easier. However, a few
discrepancies were found in the data set; for example, a Ford pickup was categorized
as a van.
•

MPG Classification
Vehicles were divided into ‘cars’ and ‘trucks’ based on their miles-per-gallon rating.
The vehicles were classified based on the EIA adjusted fuel efficiency figures from
the NHTS data set. The vehicles which had less than 20 miles per gallon were
categorized as ‘trucks,’ and those with 20 or greater miles per gallon were categorized
as ‘cars.’ Future studies could explore categorizing the vehicles based on a threshold
fuel efficiency value other than 20 MPG to see if it gives better results.
This model displayed the correct signs for most of the coefficients and they were
significant when compared to the results obtained from the NHTS classification. This
was the second-best model after the vehicle weight classification.

•

Wards Classification
Wards Automotive year book for 2001 divided vehicles in to various subcategories.7
Criteria for this segmentation were based on the body style, typical base price and
size. For vehicles where size was a major factor in determining categorization, length
was the lead determinant. Using the length criteria, the vehicles in the sample were
categorized into ‘small cars,’ ‘medium cars’ and ‘trucks.’ All cars, including luxury
and sports cars, were included under a ‘cars’ category and all SUVs, light trucks and
heavy trucks were considered as ‘trucks.’ Various models were tested. This approach
resulted in a more complicated model and thus required a bigger data set. The results
are not presented in this report.

•

Vehicle weight classification
Vehicle weights were obtained for each make and model of the vehicle from the
internet auto guide (http://www.internetautoguide.com). The median vehicle weight
was used to categorize the vehicles into ‘cars’ and ‘trucks.’

After running several models using different specifications for the above classifications, the
authors found that using vehicle weight classification gave better results with significant
coefficients and correct signs than using the NHTS categories, the MPG categories, or the
Wards categories. A future study could investigate a classification of the vehicles based on
different weight ranges other than the median weight to see if it gives better results.
The descriptive statistics for the vehicle type model using the vehicle weight classification is
presented in Table 6.2.
7

Lower small car; Upper small car; Small specialty car; Lower middle car; Upper middle car; Middle specialty
car; Large regular cab; Lower, middle and upper luxury car; Luxury specialty and sports car; Small and middle
cross utility vehicle; Small , middle and large sport utility vehicle; Small, large and luxury vans; Small and
Large pickups.
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Total

Washington

Virginia

Utah

Michigan

Colorado

Oregon
One vehicle type
Number of
households owning a
car
Number of
households owning a
truck
Total

Minnesota

Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics for vehicle type

32

52

86

53

13

95

70

401

21

26

83

52

12

39

35

267

53

78

169

105

25

134

105

669

20

26

39

36

12

55

32

220

34

46

90

63

17

74

63

387

19

27

89

34

10

35

37

251

73

99

218

133

39

164

132

858

1

1

8

4

1

10

2

27

2

3

9

5

1

6

8

34

5

17

14

7

6

16

10

75

4

9

15

11

3

13

13

68

12

30

46

27

11

45

33

204

Two vehicle types
Number of
households owning
both cars
Number of
households owning a
car and truck
Number of
households owning
both trucks
Total
Three vehicle types
Number of
households owning
all cars
Number of
households owning
all trucks
Number of
households owning
two cars and a truck
Number of
households owning
two trucks and a car
Total

6.2.3 Vehicle use model
The vehicle use model was run at the household level. The NHTS data set included the total
annual miles driven by each household and also the vehicle miles for each vehicle separately.
A separate VMT model was developed for each category of vehicles a household chooses to
own, based on the schematic in Figure 6.1. The descriptive statistics for this model are
presented in Table 6.3.
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Total

Washington

Virginia

Utah

Michigan

Colorado

Oregon

Minnesota

Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics for vehicle use

One vehicle type
Number of households
owning a car or truck
Two vehicle types
Number of households
owning both cars or both
trucks
Number of households
owning a car and truck
Total
Three vehicle types
Number of households
owning all cars or all trucks
Number of households
owning two cars and a truck
(or) two trucks and a car
Total

6.3

50

75

169

102

22

128

98

644

17

52

53

25

9

38

28

222

19

45

35

25

8

28

26

186

36

97

88

50

17

66

54

408

1

1

4

9

2

4

2

23

2

1

12

6

2

11

7

41

3

2

16

15

4

15

9
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ESTIMATION RESULTS

All estimations were performed using the program LIMDEP Version 9.0. Results of the final
models are shown in Tables 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6. The parameters of the discrete model were
estimated for three alternatives (i.e., one, two or three vehicles), and the zero-vehicle
condition was considered as the base alternative. The coefficients of the model indicate the
propensity to own one, two, or three vehicles with positive values indicating an increase in
the probability and negative values indicating a decrease in the probability. The same applies
for the vehicle type and vehicle use models.

6.3.1 Vehicle choice model
The vehicle number choice model showed that income and location has a significant effect on
the number of vehicles a household chose to own. As income increases, a household is more
likely to own a vehicle. The probability of owning more vehicles (i.e., two or three) increases
with income as shown in Table 6.4. Similarly, a household living in an urban location is less
likely to own a vehicle than a household in a rural location; and the likelihood of owning
more than one vehicle decreases for households living in an urban area. This seems
reasonable, since people living in urban areas tend to have more access to other modes or
transportation such as rail or bus, compared to those in rural areas.
Household characteristics also have a significant impact on a household’s likelihood of
owning vehicles. As the ratio of children to household size increases, households are more
likely to own vehicles. Similarly, an increase in number of workers and the presence of a
male household head increases the probability of owning vehicles. According to the results

62

obtained from this model, households with a head belonging to a young or middle age group
are less likely to own vehicles than households headed by older people. This result could be
interpreted that young and middle-aged people are more active and flexible and prefer to use
other modes of transportation.
Table 6.4: Estimation results for Vehicle ownership model
Dependent variable: Number of vehicles a household chooses to own
Number of households = 3353
One Vehicle
Two Vehicles
Three Vehicles
Variable name
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Constant
1.461**
0.504**
-0.834**
Income (I)
0.0003**
0.0005**
0.0006**
Urban (U)
-0.322*
-0.763**
-1.131**
male
0.314*
0.526**
0.710**
Children/Household size
1.174**
2.118**
1.743**
Worker count
0.478**
1.464**
2.034**
Young
-1.485**
-2.173**
-2.772**
Middle
-1.170**
-1.848**
-2.068**
** Indicates statistical significance at the .05 level
* Indicates statistical significance at the .10 level

6.3.2 Vehicle type model
Tables 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 show results for the vehicle type model, for the one-, two-, and threevehicle households. As fuel cost per mile as a percentage of income increases, people are
less likely to own any kind of a vehicle. The same is true for vehicle price as a percentage of
income. The one-vehicle and two-vehicle type models suggest the same thing. The threevehicle model, however, gave an inconsistent result. This can probably be attributed to the
insufficient data.
If a household is located in an urban area it is more likely to choose to own a car over a truck,
and it is also more likely to choose CC8 over a CT or two trucks and will choose a CT over
TT. The model was estimated with reference to the household owning two trucks. Similarly
for the three-vehicle type, the signs of the coefficient indicate that an urban household will be
less likely to choose CCC or CCT over TTT and TTT over TTC, although they are not
statistically significant, as shown in Table 6.5.
Larger households are less likely to own a car over a truck. They are also less likely to own
CC over a CT and a CT over TT. This coefficient for the three vehicle types is not
statistically significant, though the signs indicate that larger households are more likely to
own CCT over TTT and CCC. With an increase in household size the probability of choosing
TTT over CCC and CCC over TTC is less. Households with more number of workers are
likely to choose car over truck and CC over CT and TT over CT. Households with younger
household head are likely to choose car over truck. Similarly, younger household heads are
more likely to choose CC over CT and CT over TT more that the middle aged household
heads.

8

For simplicity, the following notations are used: CC-Both cars; CT-Both trucks ;TT-Both trucks; CCC-all cars;
TTT-all trucks; CCT-Two cars and a truck; TTC-Two trucks and a car
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Table 6.5: Results for vehicle type models – one-vehicle households
One-Vehicle households (Truck as the reference)
Dependent variable: Type of vehicle (Car)
Number of households= 669
Variable
Constant
Fuel cost per mile as a percentage of income (Pm)
Vehicle price as a percentage of income (Pv)
Interaction between fuel cost per mile and vehicle cost per mile (Pm*Pv)
Urban(U)
Household size
Children/Household size
Worker count
Young
Middle

Coefficient
-0.22
-7.11
-0.97
0.02*
0.62**
-0.35**
0.36
0.40**
0.51*
0.12

** Indicates statistical significance at the .05 level
* Indicates statistical significance at the .10 level

Table 6.6: Results for Vehicle type models – two-vehicle households
Two Vehicle households (Both trucks – TT – as the reference)
Dependent variable: Type of vehicle (both cars – CC)
Number of households= 858
Variable
Coefficient
Constant
-0.99**
Fuel cost per mile as a percentage of income (Pm)
-539.58*
Vehicle price as a percentage of income (Pv)
-0.77
Interaction between fuel cost per mile and vehicle cost per mile (Pm*Pv)
0.05**
Urban (U)
0.90**
Household size
-0.37*
Children/Household size
-1.22
Worker count
0.30*
Young
1.37**
Middle
0.67**
Dependent variable: Type of vehicle (car and truck – CT)
Number of households= 858
Variable
Coefficient
Constant
-0.32
Fuel cost per mile as a percentage of income (Pm)
-539.58*
Vehicle price as a percentage of income (Pv)
-0.77
Interaction between fuel cost per mile and vehicle cost per mile (Pm*Pv)
0.05**
Urban (U)
0.41**
Household size
-0.02
Children/Household size
-0.89
Worker count
-0.11
Young
1.13**
Middle
0.87**
** Indicates statistical significance at the .05 level
* Indicates statistical significance at the .10 level
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Table 6.7: Results for vehicle type models – three-vehicle households
Three-Vehicle households (Two trucks and a car – TTC – as the reference)
Dependent variable: Type of vehicle (all cars – CCC)
Number of households= 204
Variable
Coefficient
Constant
-1.28
Fuel cost per mile as a percentage of income (Pm)
-1187.66
Vehicle price as a percentage of income (Pv)
-1.63
Interaction between fuel cost per mile and vehicle cost per mile (Pm*Pv)
0.50
Urban (U)
-0.62
Household size
-0.24
Children/Household size
-3.69
Worker count
0.58
Young
1.74
Middle
0.51
Dependent variable: Type of vehicle (all trucks – TTT)
Number of households= 204
Variable
Coefficient
Constant
-0.26
Fuel cost per mile as a percentage of income (Pm)
-1187.66
Vehicle price as a percentage of income (Pv)
-1.63
Interaction between fuel cost per mile and vehicle cost per mile (Pm*Pv)
0.50
Urban (U)
-0.003
Household size
-0.41
Children/Household size
3.95
Worker count
0.16
Young
-1.05
Middle
-0.42
Dependent variable: Type of vehicle (two cars and a truck – CCT)
Number of households= 204
Variable
Coefficient
Constant
-0.66
Fuel cost per mile as a percentage of income (Pm)
-1187.66
Vehicle price as a percentage of income (Pv)
-1.63
Interaction between fuel cost per mile and vehicle cost per mile (Pm*Pv)
0.50
Urban (U)
-0.62
Household size
0.01
Children/Household size
-2.91
Worker count
0.46
Young
1.99*
Middle
0.32
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level

6.3.3 Vehicle use model
Table 6.8 shows the results for the vehicle use model. Even though the coefficients are not
significant for most of the variables, the signs do predict several possibilities. As the fuel
cost per mile for a vehicle increases, households are more likely to drive fewer miles, except
for households with three vehicles. People living in urban areas drive less compared to those
in rural areas. Households with higher incomes and those with more workers are likely to
drive higher miles. Similarly, a younger person is likely to drive more miles compared to an
older person, except for two-vehicle households owning both cars and trucks. People living in
an urban area are less likely to drive more miles. The model shows that the number of
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children and household size does not have a consistent effect on the number of miles a
household drives.
Table 6.8: Results for vehicle use model
Dependent variable: Annual household miles driven by a household
One-vehicle
Car or
truck
Number of
observations
Variable name
Constant
Fuel cost per
mile
Fuel cost per
mile*Income
Income
Urban
Children
HHsize
Wrkcount
Young
Middle

Two-vehicle

Three-vehicle
Two cars and
a truck (or)
Two trucks
All cars or
and a car
trucks

Both cars
or trucks

Car and a
truck

644

222

186

23

Coefficient
5.66**

Coefficient
8.22**

Coefficient
7.37**

Coefficient
9.15**

Coefficient
15.09**

-1.05**

-0.45*

-0.53**

-0.28

2.02**

0.0001**

0.00001

0.00002

0.00002

-0.0002**

0.0003**
-0.17*
-0.09
-0.07
0.29**
0.39
0.35

0.00005
-0.07
0.06
0.15
0.14**
-0.14
0.06

0.00008
-0.14
-0.02
0.04
0.05
0.24
0.12

0.00007
-0.13
0.11
-0.09
0.05
0.12
0.23

-0.0006**
-0.09
-0.002
-0.26
0.37**
0.74**
0.42*
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Italicized variables are log transformed
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level

6.4

APPLICATIONS OF THE DISCRETE-CONTINUOUS-CHOICE
MODELS FOR TRANSPORTATION POLICY ANALYSIS

Public policies influence the mode, frequency and distribution of travel for consumers. Any
policy which discourages people from buying and using vehicles, or which charges fees
based on miles or emissions, have potential distributional impacts. Any of these policies
could induce some drivers to drive less, own one vehicle instead of two, or choose to buy a
car instead of an SUV. Discrete-continuous choice models can be used to estimate the longrun distributional effects of such polices.

6.4.1 VMT fee
Discrete-continuous choice models can be used to estimate the impact of a VMT fee policy as
described in this section. The miles driven on a vehicle by a consumer depends on the type of
vehicle he chooses to drive and also the availability of other vehicles. If the consumers are
charged based on the miles driven, it might induce some to drive less or use more public
transit or carpools. A family with multiple cars, who used to drive individually, might choose
to travel together or carpool. Changes can be seen at both distributional and behavioral levels.
DCC models can capture these effects. Some argue that a VMT fee might discourage people
from buying more fuel efficient vehicles. It is apparent that these models can be used to
estimate the long-run effects of such a policy.
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6.4.2 Emission taxes
Emission taxes can be charged on a mileage basis to reflect emission rates per mile. This is a
policy often suggested to reduce environmental pollution. Cars produced in a given year are
subject to emissions standards that have become increasingly stringent over time. Thus, the
age of a vehicle may play an important role in determining the emissions, especially if older
cars have higher emission rates.
DCC models can be used to estimate the effects of such a policy on car choices, driving
behavior (such as miles driven), and the effects of those driving behaviors on emissions. If a
vehicle emissions tax is imposed, then drivers may buy a newer, cleaner car or a smaller car
with better fuel efficiency, fix their pollution control equipment, buy cleaner gas, or drive
fewer miles. An emissions tax could induce consumers with different incomes or household
characteristics to choose different combinations of these methods or choose other alternatives
according to their economic efficiency. Some with old cars may switch to newer or smaller
cars, while others may chose to take transit.

6.4.3 Policies that discourage vehicle ownership and use
Apart from the above policies, higher vehicle prices, fewer subsidies to buy new motor
vehicles, higher parking policies, higher registration fees, etc., may discourage vehicle
ownership and use. Providing increased subsidies to public transit, thereby increasing the
efficiency and reducing fare charges, may encourage people to use transit. Policies such as
congestion pricing schemes and other distance-based charges can encourage people to use
more transit. All these policies have an impact on the driving behavior of the consumers.
The authors have developed a working discrete-continuous choice model which is capable of
estimating the impact of a VMT fee. The current model estimates the probabilities of
households owning a specific number of vehicles, type of vehicles, and household miles
traveled under the current gasoline tax and a VMT fee in three stages. More time is required,
however, to modify and further improve the existing DCC model so as to estimate the three
models (vehicle number choice, vehicle type choice, vehicle use) simultaneously, which can
give consistent coefficient estimates. Thus further research using a DCC model is
recommended to help quantify the impacts of a VMT fee and other alternative policies.
In addition, the DCC model has been developed only at the household level; development of
the model at the vehicle level was not possible due to insufficient data. Thus future research
on a DCC model at the vehicle level will need a larger and more complete data set than what
the 2001 NHTS could provide.
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7.0

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Given the projected shortfalls in highway revenues available for building and maintaining
highways, the state of Oregon has been exploring alternatives to the current state gasoline tax
of $.24 per gallon. The Road User Fee Task Force (RUFTF), appointed by the Oregon
legislature to study the issue, suggested that a vehicle mileage fee might be considered as a
replacement for the gasoline tax for light vehicles. Given concerns that were expressed
regarding a change to a VMT fee structure, this study was undertaken to develop analytical
techniques that can be used to examine the distributional impacts of alternative fee structures.
The three major concerns were as follows:
•

The change to a VMT fee would be regressive, placing disproportionate hardship on
those in lower income groups.

•

Rural areas in Oregon would be adversely impacted relative to urban areas.

•

A change to a VMT fee would discourage people from acquiring alternative fuel
vehicles or more fuel efficient vehicles and thus would be contrary to the state and
national priority of reducing fossil fuel use.

This study developed three different methodologies that can be used to examine these issues.
The authors first used a static model that assumes that households do not change their
behavior in response to a change in the structure of user fees. Next the distributional effects
of such a policy change were analyzed using the results from an OLS regression model that
does consider the feedback effects on driving resulting from a change in user fees. These
were simple models that did not incorporate long-run vehicle choice responses to the policy
change. Thus, the static and OLS models could only deal with the first two concerns listed
above. Accordingly, the study then developed a two-stage discrete-continuous choice model
that was conceptually more satisfactory and potentially able to deal with the third concern,
but which was much more complex and data intensive.
The results from both the static and the OLS models suggested that the income distributional
impact of changing to an approximately revenue-neutral VMT fee of 1.2 cents per mile
would result in a very small increase in regressivity relative to the regressive structure of the
current gasoline tax. The impact was very small for the lowest income group, amounting to a
change of less than one percent of their income. As a comparison, the increase in total
gasoline expenditures that was caused by the near doubling of gasoline prices from $1.46/
gallon to $2.64/gallon between 2001 and 2006 was over five percent of income for the lowest
income group.
Given that the impact on income groups was virtually identical in both the static and the more
complex OLS regression models, it may be best for policymakers to use the simpler model,
as it is easier to explain. Since the user fee change was a very small percent of income for all
income groups, and there is a relatively inelastic demand for driving (especially in the short
run), it makes sense that these two approaches gave similar results in this situation. The
results from both of these models suggest that the VMT fee considered here would have a
negligible impact on income distribution or on driving behavior. Indeed, the impact of the
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overall increase in gasoline prices between 2001 and 2006 had a much bigger impact on
income distribution and still did not seem to have a significant impact on miles driven.
While the change to a VMT fee may slightly increase regressivity, the impact on rural areas
was found to be opposite to that suggested by conventional wisdom. On average a household
in a rural location would pay less under a 1.2 cents-per-mile VMT fee than under the current
gasoline tax, whereas those in urban areas would pay slightly more. This was largely due to
the lower overall average fuel efficiency in the rural vehicle fleet relative to the urban fleet
and the greater number of miles driven on average by rural households.
On the final concern, that a VMT fee would discourage adoption of more fuel efficient
vehicles, the discrete-continuous model offered an appealing approach from a theoretical
point of view. However, the authors were not able to refine it enough to produce robust
results. Findings from the static and OLS models suggested that the change to a VMT fee is
not likely to create a significant disincentive to purchase more fuel efficient or hybrid
vehicles. Once again this is because the change in fee structure has such a small impact on
the cost of driving relative to the price of gasoline. Indeed, it is continued increases in
gasoline prices, which dwarf the change in per mile user fees, that will be the factor giving
people the incentive to purchase more fuel efficient cars regardless of whether Oregon has a
gasoline tax or VMT fee structures such as the ones considered in this study.
It has been suggested that any disincentive effect to purchasing fuel efficient vehicles could
be ameliorated by designing an appropriate VMT fee structure (Whitty and Imholt 2005;
Whitty 2007). Using both the static and OLS models, the authors examined two sample
scenarios other than a flat 1.2 cents-per-mile fee. While both alternate schemes eliminated
the perceived disincentive, they were not revenue neutral; indeed, everyone would pay more
in user fees under these scenarios.
The first sample scenario was to keep the gasoline tax of 24 cents per gallon for vehicles with
fuel efficiency below 20 miles per gallon and apply a 1.2 cents-per-mile VMT fee for
vehicles that achieve 20 miles per gallon or more. The second sample scenario was a
“stepped” VMT fee such that vehicles getting less than the median miles per gallon would
pay 2 cents per mile, those between the median and 20 miles per gallon would pay 1.5 cents
per mile, and those vehicles with over 20 miles per gallon would pay 1 cent per mile.
While these sample scenarios would increase taxes paid by all, the impact was much greater
on those in rural areas, who would pay relatively more than their urban counterparts. When
regressivity was measured using the Suits index, the first scenario was found to be more
regressive than the flat fee of 1.2 cents per mile, whereas the second scenario was less
regressive than the flat fee of 1.2 cents per mile. In any case, both a VMT fee and the current
gasoline tax were shown to be regressive forms of taxation.
An obvious conclusion is that it is not possible to use one policy instrument such as a flat
VMT fee to achieve multiple policy objectives. Interestingly, a mileage fee has been
proposed to help keep the highway finance system viable, while it has also been proposed as
a way to tax vehicular emissions and as a way to structure driver insurance rates. Although
these alternatives proposed for a mileage fee are seen as ways to curb environmental
pollution and reduce accidents, it appears that they could increase the regressiveness of the
tax system.
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Thus, policymakers need to consider other policy options that can be used, possibly
simultaneously, to help achieve multiple goals. Suggested policies may be differentiated
VMT fees (as considered in this study) or other pricing schemes such as congestion pricing or
tolling roads and bridges. Parking policies, subsidies for alternative fuel or hybrid vehicles,
additional fees or taxes on vehicles with low fuel efficiency and/or high pollution emissions,
or subsidies for public transit may also be perceived as ways to achieve alternate policy
results that seem to conflict with a VMT fee. The evaluation of these welfare-improving
policies requires more sophisticated modeling tools that capture households’ adjustments in
vehicle fleet size, type, and use decisions. Although Pareto-improving policies on financing,
energy conservation, and environmental conversation in the transportation sector are pursued,
it is likely that these aforementioned policies will also create winners and losers, which
deserves the attention of future research.
Whatever the combination of policies, there will still be the need to evaluate the potential
distributional effects of regulatory action. To examine short run distributional changes, the
static and OLS models provide reasonable results as changes in vehicle ownership are likely
to take place over a long time horizon. The long-term distributional effects are likely to be
somewhat different, since people in different income groups may have differing abilities to
purchase newer vehicles, so the analysis becomes more complex. Given the long-run policy
goal of promoting fuel efficient vehicles, the authors recommend further development of the
discrete-continuous choice model, as it is much better able to deal with the long-term
question of how people change their choice of vehicles in response to such policy changes.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: INCOME GROUPS
The NHTS assigns households into one of 18 categories. We assigned the median value of
each category to each household.
Table A.1: Income groups
Income
Category
Income Ranges
1
$0 ~ $5,000
2
$5,000 ~ $9,999
3
$10,000 ~ $14,999
4
$15,000 ~ $19,999
5
$20,000 ~ $24,999
6
$25,000 ~ $29,999
7
$30,000 ~ $34,999
8
$35,000 ~ $39,999
9
$40,000 ~ $44,999
10
$45,000 ~ $49,999
11
$50,000 ~ $54,999
12
$55,000 ~ $59,999
13
$60,000 ~ $64,999
14
$65,000 ~ $69,999
15
$70,000 ~ $74,999
16
$75,000 ~ $79,999
17
$80,000 ~ $99,999
18
$100,000 or greater

Value Assigned to
Household
$2,500.00
$7,499.50
$12,499.50
$17,499.50
$22,499.50
$27,499.50
$32,499.50
$37,499.50
$42,499.50
$47,499.50
$52,499.50
$57,499.50
$62,499.50
$67,499.50
$72,499.50
$77,499.50
$89,999.50
$150,000.009

Due to the relatively small number of Oregon households in the NHTS sample, this meant
that there were very few households in some of the above 18 income groups. Accordingly,
we reorganized Oregon households into six income groups as indicated below in Table A.2
so as to provide a reasonable number of households in each category.

Table A.2: Oregon Income Groups
Income Group
1
2
3
4
5
6

Income Range
Group
$0~14,999
$15,000~29,999
$30,000~44,999
$45,000~59,999
$60,000~74,999
$75,000~200,000

9

The 2001 NHTS does not have an upper bound for this last income group. According to the Census 2000 for
Oregon, only 1.8% of all households have a total income greater than $200,000.
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APPENDIX B: SUITS INDEX, GRAPHS AND TABLES
The Suits Index is another way to measure the regressivity of a tax, or to compare the
changes in regressivity as a result of a structural change. In our case, we can compare the
regressivity of the gas tax to the VMT fee. The Suits Index is convenient in that it provides
one number that can be compared across tax regimes.
Similar to the Gini Coefficient, the 45 degree line represents the points were the proportion of
the tax paid by each income group exactly equals the proportion of the population. Points
above the 45 degree line suggest lower income groups pay more than their proportion of total
income, suggesting a regressive tax. Similarly, points below the 45 degree line would
suggest lower income families pay a lower proportion of a tax than their proportion of
income, suggesting a progressive tax. West (2002) and Walls and Hanson (1999) both
conclude a per-mile emissions fee is regressive, by calculating a Suits Index.
The Suits Index is computed as:

S = 1−

1 100
∫ T(Y )dy
5000 0

1
to keep the Suits Index bounded by -1 and 1, since the area of
5000
the upper or lower triangle will be 5000. A value of -1 suggests a perfectly regressive tax
where the lowest income group bares the entire tax burden. On the other extreme, a value of
1 suggests the highest income group bares the entire tax burden. A Suits Index equal to 0
implies we are on the 45 degree line and the tax is exactly proportional. Thus, we are
attempting to calculate the area between the curve and the 45 degree line. Since we only
have 6 income groups, and thus 6 discrete points, we can approximate the integral as:
We multiply the area by

100

1

6

∫ T(Y)dy ≈ 2 ∑{[T(y ) + T(y
i

0

i= 0

B-1

i−1

)](y i − y i−1 )}
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SUITS INDEX BASED ON OREGON STATIC MODEL

Figure B.1.1: Suits index for $0.24 gasoline tax

Suits Index = -0.17623
Table B.1.1: Suits index based on income group for $0.24 gasoline tax
Income group Accumulated income (%)
Accumulated tax
(%)
1
2.179938882
5.380472998
2
11.64535438
19.79382503
3
25.18959838
35.77177459
4
43.36117767
56.47871052
5
58.5510772
72.04696128
6
100
100
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Figure B.1.2: Suits index for VMT fee

Suits Index = -0.22542
Table B.1.2: Suits index based on income group for VMT fee
Income group Accumulated income (%)
Accumulated tax
(%)
1
2.179938882
7.545591225
2
11.64535438
26.45669222
3
25.18959838
42.12619447
4
43.36117767
59.05973543
5
58.5510772
72.50101607
6
100
100
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Figure B.1.3: Suits index for Sample Scenario #1

Suits Index = -0.18493
Table B.1.3: Suits index based on income group for Sample Scenario #1
Income group Accumulated income (%)
Accumulated tax
(%)
1
2.179938882
5.785054908
2
11.64535438
20.59514314
3
25.18959838
36.30203978
4
43.36117767
57.31056656
5
58.5510772
72.30439055
6
100
100
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Figure B.1.4: Suits index for Sample Scenario #2

Suits Index = -0.16165
Table B.1.4: Suits index based on income group for Sample Scenario #2
Income group Accumulated income (%)
Accumulated tax
(%)
1
2.179938882
5.136838462
2
11.64535438
19.256235
3
25.18959838
34.7640426
4
43.36117767
54.93690353
5
58.5510772
71.1466093
6
100
100
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B.2

SUITS INDEX BASED ON OREGON OLS MODEL

Figure: B.2.1: Suits index for $0.24 gasoline tax

Suits Index= -0.133
Table B.2.1: Suits index based on income group for $0.24 gasoline tax
Income group Accumulated income (%)
Accumulated gas tax
(%)
1
2.080566517
4.262081525
2
11.66367121
17.52323622
3
24.92327769
32.47211488
4
43.28629319
52.69766516
5
58.77005121
69.69442618
6
100
100
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Figure: B.2.2: Suits index for VMT fee

Suits Index= -0.142
Table B.2.2: Suits index based on income group for VMT fee
Income group Accumulated income (%)
Accumulated VMT
(%)
1
2.080566517
4.552139586
2
11.66367121
18.47365438
3
24.92327769
32.97689647
4
43.28629319
53.88760427
5
58.77005121
70.05302579
6
100
100
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Figure: B.2.3: Suits index for alternate policy

Suits Index= -0.14466
Table B.2.3: Suits index based on income group for alternate policy
Income group Accumulated income (%)
Accumulated tax
(%)
1
2.080566517
4.62185976
2
11.66367121
18.3890603
3
24.92327769
32.74655801
4
43.28629319
53.90247825
5
58.77005121
70.34788312
6
100
100
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Figure: B.2.4: Suits index for step fee

Suits Index= -0.110720
Table B.2.4: Suits index based on income group for step fee
Income group
Accumulated income (%)
1
2
3
4
5
6

2.080566517
11.66367121
24.92327769
43.28629319
58.77005121
100
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Accumulated step fee
(%)
4.009637876
16.69068834
31.20241687
50.37868655
68.13748159
100
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APPENDIX C: DETAILED DATA DESCRIPTIONS
C.1

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES FOR OLS ANALYSIS

The data used in the OLS estimation is based on the NHTS data, or were derived from the
NHTS data set. All variables used are described below. If the variable was modified, it is
described in this table.
Variable
PM

Variable Name
Fuel Cost Per Mile
Under the Gasoline
Tax

I

Household Income

SUB

Description
Weighted average by miles driven. The fuel cost per
mile used in the estimation is the fuel cost per mile
under the gasoline tax. Fuel cost per mile for
vehicle i is defined as:
Pi
MPGi
Where Pi is the reported fuel price and MPGi is the
EIA adjusted fuel efficiency in the NHTS data. If
the MPG was not reported for a particular vehicle,
the average for reported vehicle MPG was used for
the missing value(s). Thus, for a household with
two vehicles,
⎡⎛ m ⎞ P
⎛ m ⎞ P2 ⎤
PM = ln⎢⎜ 1 ⎟ 1 + ⎜ 2 ⎟
⎥
⎣⎝ M ⎠ MPG1 ⎝ M ⎠ MPG2 ⎦
Where m1 is the reported miles for vehicle 1, m2 is
the reported miles for vehicle 2 and M = m1 + m2 .

NHTS reported income group. Households put
themselves in one of 18 income categories based on
income ranges. We then assigned households the
median value for their category. For example,
income group 3 was defined as a household that
earns between $10,000 and $14,999. Thus, for this
household, I = ln(12,499.50).
Substitution Indicator Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household owns
more than one type of vehicle and 0 otherwise. This
is based on the NHTS variable for “vehicle type.”
1 = Car/Station Wagon
2 = Van
3 = SUV
4 = Pickup Truck
5 = Other Truck
6 = RV
7 = Motorcycle
91 = Other
We treat values 4 and 5 as the same, and consider
these as “trucks,” though this was not an issue in the
Oregon OLS sample.
For example, if a household owns two cars, SUB=0.

C-1

U

C

MALE

WORK
CHILD

PM * I

PM * SUB

If a household owns a car and a van, SUB=1.
Location Indicator
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is
located in an urban area, 0 otherwise. Location
indicators are based on the Census 2000 definition.
According to the Census 2000, an urban area is
defined as an area with:
1. “Core census block groups or blocks that
have a population density of at least 1,000
people per square mile and
2. “Surrounding census blocks that have an
overall density of at least 500 people per
square mile.”
(From U.S. Census Bureau, Available at:
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/ua/ua_2k.html.
Accessed on August 24, 2007)
Vehicle Count
This variable was modified from the vehicle count
variable in the NHTS dataset. If a household
reported zero miles driven on a vehicle, that vehicle
was excluded, and subtracted from the NHTS
vehicle count variable. Also, if miles for a vehicle
was missing, it was again assumed the vehicle was
not used and was subtracted from the NHTS vehicle
count.
Gender of Household Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household
Respondent Indicator respondent is a male, 0 otherwise. Unmodified from
the NHTS data set, except that the NHTS uses
values 1 and 2, which we changed to 0 or 1.
NHTS: Defines Male=1, Female=2. We change the
NHTS variable to Male=1, Female=0.
Number of Workers Unmodified variable from the NHTS dataset.
in Household
Number of Children Derived from the NHTS dataset. We define the
in Household
number of children as the total number of people in
the household minus the number of adults.
Product of Fuel Cost This is an interaction term between the fuel cost per
Per Mile and Income mile for the household and the household income.
This allows for different elasticities for different
income groups.
Product of Fuel Cost This is an interaction term between the fuel cost per
Per Mile and the mile for the household and the substitution dummy
Substitution Indicator variable. This allows for different elasticities for
households with multiple vehicle types and those
without.
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C.2

DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES FOR DCC ANALYSIS

Variables for the DCC are the same as those defined for the OLS except for those differences
listed below.
Pm

Fuel cost per mile as
a
percentage
of
income

Pv

Vehicle price as a
percentage of income

HHsize

Household size

Derived for each vehicle from the vehicle file of
the NHTS data set. It is computed as gas cost
(GSCOST) divided by miles per gallon
(EIADMPG). This value is then divided by
income.
For each make and model as given in the vehicle
file of the NHTS data set, the vehicle prices were
obtained from the Ward’s year book 2001. This
vehicle price is then divided over income.
This value is obtained directly from the 2001
NHTS data set.

Children/hhsize Children as a
The number of children is obtained by subtracting
percentage of
the number of adults (given in the NHTS data)
household
from the household size.
size
Young and
Age of the household The NHTS data set has an age variable. This is
Middle
respondent
divided in to three categories Young (age<=30);
Middle (age>30 and <=60) and Senior (age>60).
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APPENDIX D: CONSUMER SURPLUS, REVENUE AND
WELFARE DEFINITIONS
To calculate the change in consumer surplus for the individual household, we use the
following equation,

1
SURPLUS = {(PM − PVMT ) ∗ (MILESGAS + MILESVMT )}
2
The difference (PM − PVMT ) determines the sign of the change. If the fuel cost per mile under
the VMT ( PVMT ) fee exceeds the fuel cost per mile under the gasoline tax ( PM ), we expect a
reduction in total consumer surplus as we move upward along the linear demand curve.
Similarly, if the fuel cost per mile decreases under the new policy, we expect household miles
to increase as it becomes cheaper for households to drive and thus, increase the total
consumer surplus as we move downward along the linear demand curve.
Revenue collected by the state agency for each household is calculated using the following
equation,
⎡⎛ 0.24 ⎞
⎤
REVENUE = 0.012 * MILESVMT − ⎢⎜
⎟ * MILESGAS ⎥
⎦
⎣⎝ HHMPG ⎠

Household miles are based on the predicted (fitted) values estimated by the model, first under
the gasoline tax ( MILESGAS ), then under the VMT fee ( MILESVMT ). To calculate the net
gasoline taxes collected, we consider only the $0.24 collected per gallon sold. Since we do
not estimate the miles driven on individual vehicles, we cannot calculate the gasoline tax
revenue collected by vehicle. Instead, we use the weighted average household fuel efficiency
( HHMPG ) to calculate the per-mile cost in terms of the gasoline tax. We consider only a
flat-rate VMT fee, and we can calculate the revenue collected by multiplying the per-mile fee
($0.012) by the predicted household miles under the VMT fee.
Since we do not calculate a supply function, we use the revenue collected by the state agency
to calculate the welfare changes, rather than the standard producer’s surplus. Thus, welfare
for each household is calculated as,
WELFARE = SURPLUS + REVENUE
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